The Federal and State response to the Problem of Child maltreatment in America: A Survey of the Reporting Statutes by unknown
Nova Law Review
Volume 2, Issue 1 1978 Article 3
The Federal and State response to the Problem
of Child maltreatment in America: A Survey
of the Reporting Statutes
Copyright c©1978 by the authors. Nova Law Review is produced by The Berkeley Electronic
Press (bepress). https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr
The Federal and State response to the Problem
of Child maltreatment in America: A Survey
of the Reporting Statutes
Abstract
Society’s concern with the abuse and neglect of children is not a new phenomenon, but as
a result of heightened awareness by professionals and by the public in general, this problem is
receiving new and intense scrutiny.
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Society's concern with the abuse and neglect of children is not a new
phenomenon,1 but as a result of heightened awareness by professionals
and by the public in general, this problem is receiving new and intense
scrutiny. The issue extends to all members of society and particularly
highlights the relationships existing between the legal, medical, and
social services. Child abuse and neglect arise from a wide range of social
and psychological problems that cannot be managed by any one disci-
pline or profession. Physicians, lawyers, judges, teachers, and others
must work together if the continuing cycle of maltreatment of children
is to be broken.2
While all fifty states3 and Washington, D.C.,4 have child abuse
statutes in one form or another, the legal framework provided for the
protection of children in many instances is fragmented and unnecessar-
ily complex. It is not unusual to find that workers involved with protect-
ing children from abuse are not adequately equipped and trained to meet
the critical demands assigned to them.5 Too often, the only treatment
alternatives available to both child and parent are infrequent and in-
adequate home visits by social agencies, and overused foster care where
the child may be moved from one home to another.
1. For an excellent discussion of the fate of children in history, see Thomas, Child
Abuse and Neglect Part I. Historical Overview, Legal Matrix, and Social Perspectives,
50 N.C. L. REv. 293 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Child Abuse and Neglect]. Child
abuse is deeply ingrained in our cultural history. Many children who were ill or de-
formed at birth were murdered for reasons of maintaining a controlled population. It
had long been an acceptable practice for children to be sold into bondage, tortured, or
murdered.
2. See text accompanying notes 68-78, infra.
3. See note 122, infra.
4. Id. For statistical purposes, Washington, D.C. will be considered a state.
5. Extension of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 1977: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Child and Human Development of the Senate Comm. on
Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 174 (1977-1978) (statement of Arabella Marti-
nez, Assistant Secretary for Human Development) [hereinafter referred to as 1977
Senate Hearings].
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In dealing with child abuse, ope is almost immediately confronted
with traditional societal values which have precluded overt interference
with the "integrity and sanctity of the family and for the privacy of its
interrelationships."' With the emergence of a greater understanding of
the physical and psychological damage caused by child abuse, societal
interest is moving toward an awareness of the need to promote the
health and well-being of children. This concern has made itself known
through the child abuse and neglect legislation enacted at federal and
state levels within the past fifteen years.
1. EARLY HISTORY OF CHILD ABUSE IN AMERICA
It has been suggested that it is the very abhorrence of child abuse
which has made it such a slow-moving area of both federal and state
concern. The idea that a parent, who is supposed to love and protect
his offspring, could be responsible for the child's physical injury or
emotional deprivation is so repulsive that many are reluctant to believe
it. 7 The federal and state governments have also been hesitant to become
involved in the internal mechanisms of the family. This implied hands-
off policy followed by these governmental units is traceable to their
close association with English common law.8 Under the common law,
the right of the father to custody and control of his offspring was consid-
ered almost absolute, even where this was at odds with the welfare of
the child.'
A child in colonial America was ruled over by the father. Parental
discipline was quick, decisive, and severe.10 In a very real sense, the child
6. NAT'L. CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT, U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH, EDU-
CATION & WELFARE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CHILD
ABUSE & NEGLECT (1976) [hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS].
7. D. BAKAN, SLAUGHTER OF THE INNOCENTS 13 (1972).
8. The public welfare policy of this country originated with the passage in 1601
of England's Poor Relief Act. It later became popularly known as the Elizabethan Poor
Law. The philosophy which put this legislation into action considered poverty a dis-
grace. The poor and destitute were considered a burden on the rest of society. Poverty
was considered the result of one's own inability to better oneself. Welfare practices in
this country were influenced by these English concepts. The use of physical force with
children was permitted as a normal part of child-rearing behavior. PROCEEDINGS, supra
note 6, at 55.
9. Singleman, A Case of Neglect: Parens Patriae Versus Due Process in Child
Neglect Proceedings, 17 ARIZ. L. REV. 1055 (1975). See also Note, Custody and Con-
trol of Children, 5 FORDHAM L. REV. 460 (1936).
10. Child Abuse and Neglect, supra note 1, at 300.
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was considered little more than the property of his parents." It was not
unusual for a child to be bound out to other households as an indentured
servant or apprentice.'2 The shortage of labor in the American colonies,
as well as the pervasive Puritan work ethic, was reflected by early laws
passed by the various colonial legislatures." These early laws made a
distinction between apprenticeship and servitude, but this was not al-
ways observed." Eventually two forms of apprenticeship evolved. Under
a voluntary apprenticeship, the child and his parents entered into an
agreement on their own initiative. The other form, compulsory appren-
ticeship, resulted from the practice of binding out dependent children,
who had little or no say in the choice of their master or trade. 5 As time
passed, laws were enacted which prohibited the binding out of infants,
but the practice of binding out children beyond infancy continued.
The earliest documented case of child abuse involved a master and
his apprentice. 6 In Salem, Massachusetts, in 1639, a man by the name
of Marmaduke Perry was arraigned for the death of his apprentice. The
evidence given stated that the boy had been ill-treated and subject to
unreasonable correction by his master. 7 However, the boy's own charge
that the fractured skull he suffered was due to a broomstick blow deliv-
ered by his master (which later resulted in the boy's death) was disputed
by testimony that the boy had told another person that he received the
blow from falling out of a tree. The defendant was found not guilty. A
Massachusetts court found another master guilty of extraordinary abuse
of an apprentice; he was executed in 1643.18 Other early cases show the
masters of servant children being verbally reprimanded, having their
chattels confiscated, or even requiring that the children be freed from
11. See 5 FORDHAM L. REv., supra note 9, at 460.
12. Apprenticeships were often used by local governments to ensure that children
were placed in a home environment which could adequately meet their needs. The need
to fully utilize scarce labor was a strong economic factor of the times which overrode
all other considerations. On many occasions, these apprenticeship practices were carried
out by court officials despite the objections of the childrens' economically-disadvantaged
parents.
13. 1 CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, 1600-
1865, at 122 (R. Bremmer ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as I CHILDREN AND YOUTH].
14. Thomas, Child Abuse and Neglect Part II: Historical Overview, Legal Ma-
trix, and Social Perspectives in North Carolina, 54 N.C. L. REv. 743, 745 (1976).
15. Child Abuse and Neglect, supra note 1, at 301.
16. 1 CHILDREN AND YOUTH, supra note 13, at 122.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 123.
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indenture because of their ill treatment. 9 In 1700, the colony of Virginia
issued specific laws for the protection of servants against mistreat-
ment.'0
The vast majority of these early cases dealt exclusively with the
issue of a master's maltreatment of child servants. There is no indication
of a similar movement to protect children from abusive or neglectful
parents. Available court action involving the family was limited to re-
moval of the child from an "unsuitable" home environment.2'
"Unsuitable" usually referred to the parents' not providing their chil-
dren with an adequate religious upbringing, or a general failure to teach
them to become productive members of society.22 There were two Mas-
sachusetts cases, in 1675 and 1678, in which children were removed
because of "unsuitable" homes231 The first case involved children who
were removed from the home because the father refused to see that they
were "put forth to service as the law directs. 124 The second case gave
similar justification for the removal of children from the home environ-
ment, with that offense being compounded by the refusal of the father
to attend church services on a regular basis.2
The "societal solution" for disadvantaged children in the cities was
to place them in almshouses. 6 Conditions in these poorhouses were
unsatisfactory for adult paupers, let alone young children.2 1 It was not
19. Child Abuse and Neglect, supra note 1, at 304.
20. 1 CHILDREN AND YOUTH, supra note 13, at 127.
21. Id. at 40.
22. Id. The "New England" or public vendue method of pauper relief was an
ingenious and thrifty variant of the apprenticeship practices of the times. The town poor,
the young, and the old were auctioned off to the lowest bidder for their services. The
bidder who had the lowest bid would then accept his payment from public funds and
take the child home as a servant or apprentice. The children usually came either from
poor families or from families which the community felt would raise the children to
become vagrants and undesirables.
23. Child Abuse and Neglect, supra note 1, at 304.
24. 1 CHILDREN AND YOUTH, supra note 13, at 41.
25. Id.
26. By 1800, the system of almshouses in the United States was rapidly becoming
institutionalized. Some 16 states had such a system in extensive operation. The
"almshouse" approach lasted until the end of the 1800's. Reform was slow owing to
the resistance of those who ran the almshouses and had a large investment in the lands
and buildings used. The ease with which children could be placed in such institutions
and forgotten, and the inability to come up with alternative methods of care, also
created a state of inertia against change. Child Abuse and Neglect, supra note 1, at
304.
27. Id., where it was reported that a large number of children (both poor and
2:1978 1
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until the beginning of the nineteenth century that major efforts were
made to provide separate residences for children, and it took nearly 100
more years before broad-based improvements appeared. 8
The near absence of recorded family child abuse cases in the early
history of this country suggests a trend of the courts to allow a child's
parents their own discretion in determining the kind and degree of
discipline in the home. Parents were believed to be immune from prose-
cution unless the disciplining of children went beyond the bounds of
reasonableness in relation to the offense, or was deemed excessive, or
injured the child permanently.? There existed a legal presumption in the
courts which favored the conduct of the parents as being reasonable."
An 1840 criminal case in Tennessee involved parental prosecution
for excessive punishment."1 The court record indicates that the mother
had repeatedly beaten the child with her fists, and that both parents had
systematically maltreated the child. The court, in reversing the mother's
conviction, noted without citing any precedent that the "right of parents
to chastise their refractory and disobedient children is so necessary to
the government of families . . . that no moralist or lawgiver has ever
thought of interfering with its existence. ... 1
A. Nineteenth Century Awakening of Concern
It was not until the second decade of the nineteenth century that
orphaned) were indiscriminately placed with adult paupers, the mentally unbalanced
and retarded, alcoholics, and persons suffering from venereal disease.
28. See Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L.
REv. 1193 (1970), for an examination of the events leading up to the passage of the 1899
Illinois Juvenile Court Act. One of the purposes of the Act was to improve the condition
of children in orphanages, poor houses, and detention centers.
29. Child Abuse and Neglect, supra note 1, at 305.
30. See State v. Pendergrass, 19 N.C. 348 (1837). Even though this case con-
cerned the right of a teacher to punish a child in the classroom, the court interpreted
this right as being coextensive with that of a parent. See also Kleinfield, The Balance
of Power Between Infants, Parents and the State, 4 FAM. L. Q. 408, 413 (1970).
31. Johnson v. State, 21 Tenn. 282 (1840).
32. Id. In this case, the question for the jury to determine was whether the
correction of a child by the defendant so far exceeded the reasonable limits of parental
duty and authority as to amount to a trespass and breach of the peace. The court was
of the opinion that this was a conclusion of fact, to be drawn by the jury, rather than a
conclusion of law. The trial court judge had charged the jury in such a manner as to
encroach upon the province of the jury regarding matters of fact. The court reversed
the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial.
17 1
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public authorities began to interfere in cases of parental neglect. Most
of these reform movements were directed toward children in institu-
tions, however, and were aimed primarily at preventing a neglected child
from entering a life of crime." Probably the most significant and
helpful of these numerous reform campaigns for child protection was
launched by persons connected with the American Society for the Pre-
vention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA).
In New York City in 1874, an old woman near death informed a
church worker who lived in a nearby building that she was aware of a
young girl who was being terribly treated by her step-mother. As a last
wish the old woman wanted to tell someone about this "so she could
rest in peace."34 The church worker sought the help of Henry Bergh
who at that time was the president of the ASPCA. Bergh looked into
the matter and soon thereafter decided to initiate an action, not as
president of the ASPCA, but rather as an individual. He did, however,
use the services of two of the Society's attorneys-Elbridge Gerry and
Ambrose Monell-as legal counsel in the matter. 5 The child, Mary
Ellen Wilson, was apprenticed to her step-mother Mary Connolly in
1866. At that time Mary Ellen was less than two years old. The New
York Times printed a number of articles concerning court hearings in
the spring of 1874 which have formed the basis for a case history.
On April 13, 1874, Mrs. Connolly was indicted by the Grand Jury
of the Court of General Sessions for various offenses which included
"five indictments for assault and battery, felonious assault, assault with
intent to do bodily harm, assault with intent to kill, and assault with
intent to maim. '37 Evidence presented at trial by numerous witnesses
33. See Fox, supra note 28, at 1232-33. Fox noted that the concept of preventive
penology rested essentially on the belief that society could recognize the conditions of
childhood that would give rise to adult criminals, and develop techniques such as institu-
tions, foster homes, and specific probation procedures that would be able to arrest the
condition and prevent the crime. It was believed that legal mechanisms could be used
to enact legislation that could carry out these "reforms."
34. 2 CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, 1866-
1932, at 185 (R. Bremmer ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as 2 CHILDREN AND YOUTH].
See also Child Abuse and Neglect, supra note 1, at 307-10, for a thorough discussion
of the Mary Ellen case.
35. Child Abuse and Neglect, supra note I, at 307. See also N.Y. Times, April
II, 1874, at 2, col. 6.
36. The New York Times provides much of the knowledge of this case through a
series of articles which it printed from April 10, 1874, through December 12, 1875.
37. N.Y. Times, April 14, 1874, at 2, col. 4.
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strongly indicated that a severe condition of abuse and neglect had
purposefully been perpetrated against Mary Ellen. The jury returned a
verdict of guilty after only twenty minutes of deliberation. Mrs. Con-
nolly was sentenced to one year at hard labor in the state prison.38 Mary
Ellen was later sent to the Sheltering Arms, an orphanage in New York
City.
One commentator has noted that "some historical and legal confu-
sion has resulted from the close relationship between the animal and
child protection movements in connection with this case." 39 A number
of articles in the legal and social service fields cite the myth of the Mary
Ellen case as an instance where the ASPCA used the laws against
cruelty to animals as the basis for protecting the child.40 In reciting this
myth, these articles concluded that Mary Ellen, as a member of the
animal kingdom, was entitled to the protection of laws originally en-
acted to safeguard animals from cruel treatment. The facts of the Mary
Ellen case clearly demonstrate a state of governmental neglect with
regard to the supervision and protection of children after agency place-
ments had been made.41
In the aftermath of public indignation over the case, Elbridge T.
Gerry, the ASPCA attorney whose services were used by Bergh,
founded the New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Chil-
dren (NYSPCC). It was originally organized as a private group and
later incorporated. Legislation was soon thereafter passed in New York
which authorized the NYSPCC and later similar societies to file com-
plaints for the violation of any laws relating to children. A requirement
of this legislation was that law enforcement officials and the courts were
to aid the societies whenever possible.4"
Similar societies were soon organized in other cities throughout the
nation, and by 1922 there existed some 57 Societies for the Prevention
of Cruelty to Children, and 307 humane societies concerned with the
welfare of children. With the advent of government intervention into
38. N.Y. Times, April 28, 1874, at 8, col. 1.
39. Child Abuse and Neglect, supra note 1, at 308.
40. The myth of the Mary Ellen case continues to appear from time to time in
social and legal literature. Some recent articles containing the myth include: Daly,
Willful Child Abuse and State Reporting Statutes, 23 U. MIAMI L. REV. 283, 284
(1969); Friedrich & Borniskin, Child Abuse and Neglect in North Dakota, 53 N. DAK.
L. REV. 197, 200 (1976); Katz, Legal Research on Child Abuse and Neglect: Past and
Future, II FAM. L. Q. 151 n.1 (1977).
41. Child Abuse and Neglect, supra note 1, at 310.
42. Id. at 310.
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child welfare, however, the number of these societies began to decline
rapidly.13
B. Some Familial Characteristics of Child Abuse
An early commentator on the treatment of children noted that "the
general history of the child . . . moves as from one mountain peak to
another with a long valley of gloom in between." 44 Numerous reform
movements have been inaugurated with the hope of curtailing child
abuse only to fall by the wayside as the shocking facts of abuse and
neglect become avoided or forgotten over time. 5 Concern reawakened
when a pediatric radiologist wrote an article in 1946 which called to the
attention of the medical community an "unrecognized trauma" de-
scribed as subdural hematomas and multiple bone abnormalities in chil-
dren he had treated." Seven years later, in 1953, Dr. Silverman wrote
an article describing multiple fractures due to recurrent trauma.47 By
1955, medical journal authors had begun to recognize that the injuries
previously called "unrecognized trauma" were inflicted intentionally by
abusive parents." Doctors Wooley and Evans wrote an article in 1955
suggesting the possibility of parental or child custodial abuse.4"
The spark in this resurgence of interest in child abuse was not a
case of abuse like the trial of Mary Ellen's guardian, but rather the
advent of a technological revolution which had changed the course of
medicine. The beneficial uses of x-rays by pediatric radiologists have
43. Id. at 313.
44. G. PAYNE, THE CHILD IN HUMAN HISTORY 302 (1916), as quoted in Child
Abuse and Neglect, supra note 1, at 293.
45. Child Abuse and Neglect, supra note 1, at 293.
46. Caffey, Multiple Fractures on the Long Bones of Infants Suffering from
Chronic Subdural Hematoma, 56 AM. J. ROENTGENOLOGY 163 (1946). Subdural hema-
toma is defined as "[a] hematoma (localized collection of clotted blood) occurring
beneath the dura mater (which is the outer of the three membranes covering the brain
and spinal cord)." J. SCHMIDT, 2 ATTORNEY'S DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE S-135 (1975).
Caffey did not explain what may have caused such injuries, only that they were trau-
matic in origin. This gave rise to the phrase associated with such injuries-
"unrecognized trauma."
47. Silverman, The Roentgen Manifestations of Unrecognized Skeletal Trauma
in Infants, 69 AM. J. ROENTGENOLOGY 413 (1953).
48. See, e.g., Bakwin, Multiple Skeletal Lesions in Young Children Due to
Trauma, 49 J. PEDIATRICS 57 (1956).
49. Wooley & Evans, Significance of Skeletal Lesions in Infants Resembling
Those of Traumatic Origin, 158 J.A.M.A. 593 (1955).
2:t978 1
8
Nova Law Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [1978], Art. 3
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol2/iss1/3
Child Abuse-Federal and State Response
resulted in more sophisticated ways of seeing subdural hematomas and
abnormal fractures. 50
It was not until July 1962, however, that the full impact of physical
abuse was brought to the attention of the medical profession and subse-
quently to the social service and legal professions, as well. 51 At that time,
Dr. C. Henry Kempe and others published the classic paper which
defined the battered child syndrome as "a term used by us to character-
ize a clinical condition in young children who have received serious
physical abuse, generally from a parent or foster parent."-,2 The impact
of this paper was considerable. The concept of child abuse as inflicted
injury in the Kempe paper was admittedly narrow.53 Dr. Fontana pro-
posed a more broadly defined maltreatment syndrome in which the child
"often presents itself without obvious signs of being battered but with
the multiple minor evidences of emotional and at times, nutritional
deprivation, neglect and abuse. The battered child is only the last phase
of the spectrum of the maltreatment syndrome. ''5
Numerous studies indicate that in families with more than one
child, usually only one of the children is singled out for systematic
abuse. 55 Race, ethnic background, and the socio-economic status of
abusive parents have been found to have no correlation with child
abuse.56 Recent studies have found that child abuse and neglect are not
50. The abused child may have fractures distributed about the body. The value
of x-rays rests essentially on the ease with which previous fractures, some of which may
not be fully healed, can be discerned. To the informed physician, a child's skeleton can
reveal a long history of abuse by telltale signs of unaided bond healing. Silverman,
Radiological Aspects of the Battered Child Syndrome, in THE BATTERED CHILD
(Kempe & Heifer, eds., 2d ed., 1974).
51. During the early 1960's, th6 contribution of legal scholars to the area of child
abuse literature was confined primarily to nonlegal publications: Gil, The Legal Nature
of Neglect, 6 NATIONAL PROBATION AND PAROLE A.J. 1 (1960); Harper, The Physician,
The Battered Child, and the Law, 31 PEDIATRICS 899 (1963).
52. Kempe, Silverman, Steele, Droegemueller, & Silver, The Battered Child
Syndrome, 181 J.A.M.A. 17 (1962).
53. Id. at 19.
54. Fontana, Donovan, & Wong, The "Maltreatment Syndrome" in Children,
269 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 1389 (1963).
55. See Note, The Battered Child: Logic in Search of Law, 8 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
374 (1971); see also Daly, supra note 40, at 290.
56. Note, supra note 55, at 374. But see Newberger & Hyde, ChildAbuse, Princi-
ples and Implications of Current Pediatric Practice, 22 PEDIATRIC CLINICS OF NORTH
AMERICA 695 (1975), where it has been observed that child abuse is associated with
poverty, low birth weight, and social isolation.
1 2:1978
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problems of poor and marginal families alone. 7 They are problems
which affect children of all social classes. Yet child abuse in poor and
marginal families is most often reported. One reason may be that the
more affluent families, whose children receive their medical care in
private practice settings, have a different relationship between practi-
tioner and family. These families tend to have their injuries character-
ized as "accidents," which connotes isolated, random events.58 Research
has shown that there is an association between childhood accidents and
child abuse and neglect.5 9 Many child abuse and neglect cases in wealth-
ier homes are misdiagnosed as "accidents." The terms "abuse" and
"neglect" carry important, implicit judgments which doctors are often
reluctant to make.60 As one commentator notes:
It's easier to make the diagnosis of child abuse if you are a physician
in an inner-city hospital room or in a clinic for the indigent. . . . It is
also less painful to report the case, where the family is not paying you
directly, and where you may never see them again.6
Estimates of child abuse and neglect range from projections of
10,000 children abused each year to one million.62 Clear empirical
knowledge as to the number of deaths resulting from child abuse and
severe neglect is also limited. Estimates range from 700 per year 3 to
6,000 per year.64 Because of this wide range of estimates, it is difficult
to draw a conclusion as to the actual incidence of child abuse in this
country.65 The information gleaned from official statistics must be quali-
57. See Daly, supra note 40, at 290.
58. 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 44 (statement of Eli Newberger).
59. Id.
60. id. at 53.
61. Id.
62. See Grumet, The Plaintive Plaintiffs: Victims of the Battered Child
Syndrome, 4 FAM. L.Q. 296, 301 (1970), for an early estimate of the frequency of abuse
cases. One commentator has estimated abuse cases in excess of one million. Light,
Abused and Neglected Children in America, 43 HARV. EDuc. REv. 556, 567 (1975).
63. V. FONTANA, THE MALTREATED CHILD: THE MALTREATMENT SYNDROME IN
CHILDREN 6 (2d ed. 1971).
64. Kempe, Approaches to Preventing Child Abuse, 130 AM. J. Dis. CHILD. 941,
945 (1976).
65. A number of research projects use what might be termed "statistical al-
chemy" in developing incidence rates for child abuse in this country. The use of local
or regional estimates applied to the national population only yield a distorted, if not
inaccurate, picture of the true incidence of abuse. 1977 SENATE HEARINGS, supra note
5, at 12.
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fled by the fact that they represent only "caught" cases of abuse which
became cases through varied reporting and confirmation procedures."
While physical punishment of children appears to be almost a uni-
versal aspect of the parent-child relationship, very little is known about
the modes and patterns of violence toward children. Numerous studies
have shown that abuse in families may not be as fiaphazard an occurr-
ence as has been previously supposed." One expert believes that this
generation's battered children, if they survive, will become the next
generation's battering parents."8 The most important aspect of this
"cyclical pattern" is that of those neglected and abused children who
survive, many will suffer future emotional and psychological crippling
which will be passed on to succeeding generations. 9 Abusive and neg-
lectful parents have often been found to be lonely, isolated people, with
few friends and little outside contact with society.7° Numerous forms of
dysfunction of the home environment may occur in conjunction with
instances of child abuse.71
The abuse and neglect of children by parents may occur at any age
with an increased incidence in children under three years of age. A large
percentage of these children are under six months of age.72 The lives of
abusing parents are often marked with divorce, extra-marital relation-
ships, alcoholism, poor housing, and financial distress.73 These stress
66. Another difficulty in determining what is an accurate picture of the abuse
problem is relying solely on reported or "caught" cases of child abuse and neglect. Like
the tip of an iceberg, which may only represent 10% of the total mass, "caught" cases
of abuse do not accurately represent the totality of the problem. The statistics used by
many researchers should be prefaced by a statement explaining what they actually
are-"educated guesses."
67. See D. GIL, VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN: PHYSICAL CHILD ABUSE IN THE
UNITED STATES 27 (1971); Friedrich & Borniskin, supra note 40, at 205.
68. 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 502 (statement of Vincent J. Fontana,
M.D.).
69. Child Abuse and Neglect, supra note 1, at 335.
70. See, e.g., Friedrich & Borniskin, supra note 40, at 205; Note, supra note 55,
at 375; Daly, supra note 40, at 292.
71. Friedrich & Borniskin, supra note 40, at 202, where it was noted that marital
conflict, social isolation, and the social pressures of financial adversity act in conjunc-
tion with the abuse of children who are members of families with such difficulties.
72. 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 505 (statement of Vincent J. Fontana,
M.D.). Very young children are abused more often than older children because they are
usually unable to protect themselves and generally must rely on the help of others.
73. The National Clearinghouse on Child Abuse and Neglect, Children's Division
of the American Humane Association, gathered information on child abuse and neglect
23 1
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factors all contribute to the condition that causes the potentially abusive
parent to strike out at a special child during a crisis situation. The
parents' own lack of love, support, and protection makes them unable
to give love, affection, and empathic care to their own children. 74 One
commentator has developed a schema of the life cycle of an abused child
becoming an abusing parent. 75 The schema is entitled the World of
for the calendar year 1975. In examining the figures which follow, the caveats stated in
notes 65-66, supra, should be considered.
I. Reporting: Neglect and Abuse Number Per cent
Total number of reports of 289,837
neglect and abuse
Number of cases investigated 228,899 79.0%
Status undetermined 60,938 21.0%
Of investigated cases of
neglect and abuse: (228,899)
found to be valid 136,504 59.6%
found not valid 92,395 40.4%
II. Alleged Abusers-Neglecters
Natural parents (83.80%)
Step-parents (6.08%)
Adoptive parents (0.10%)
Paramours (1.80%)
I1. Types of Abuse Reported
Physical injuries, minor 30,310 (50.3%)
Sexual abuse 6,372 (10.6%)
Physical injuries, major 1,384 (2.3%)
Burns, scalding 1,578 (2.6%)
Physical abuse (unspecified) 20,557 (34.1%)
Proposed Extension of the Child Abuse and Treatment Act, 1977: Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Select Education of the House Committee on Education and Labor,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 149 (1977-78) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
74. This emotional neglect, or the lack of a warm, sensitive interaction necessary
for the child's optimal growth and development, may have tragic consequences for the
child as he reaches adulthood. The absence of adequate empathic care or mothering
during the first two years of life may cause the child to lack basic trust and confidence.
NAT'L CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION &
WELFARE, 1 CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: THE PROBLEM AND ITS MANAGEMENT 18
(1975).
75. R. Heifer, THE DIAGNOSTIC PROCESS AND TREATMENT PROCESS 26 (U.S.
Dep't. Health, Ed., & Welfare, Publ. No. (OHD) 75-69, 1975).
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Abnormal Rearing, or the WAR cycle. It views a child from conception
through mating, with the intervening steps illustrating how environmen-
tal factors may largely determine how the child will function in society. 7
The inability of abusive parents to cope with the rearing of their
children has led commentators to suggest that the essential element in
this abuse and neglect is not the parents' intention to destroy the chil-
dren, but rather their inadequacy to nurture them properly. 77 This in-
ability to care for children may cause such children to suffer emotional
as well as physical trauma which, if allowed to continue, will ultimately
threaten their survival. 78
2. THE LEGAL RESPONSE-CHILD ABUSE
LEGISLATION AT FEDERAL AND STATE LEVELS
Without adequate guidance at federal and state levels, little success
can be expected in the areas of preventing and treating cases of child
abuse and neglect. The grim reality of child abuse and the revelations
of research in this area have spurred communities into social action.
Public concern and recognition of need have pressured legislative bodies
into giving attention to the problem at a pace with little precedent in
recent legislative history. 79 The introduction of child abuse legislation in
1963 amounted to eighteen bills, eleven of which achieved passage that
year." California was reputed to be the first state in the nation to have
enacted a child abuse reporting statute, which required certain desig-
nated groups to report known or suspected instances of abuse., In 1964,
ten more states passed reporting laws, with another twenty-six states
76. For a brief examination of the twelve steps of the WAR cycle, see Friedrich
& Borniskin, supra note 40, at 206.
77. Newberger, The Myth of the Battered Child Syndrome, 40 CURRENT MED.
DIALOG 327 (1973).
78. Id.
79. See Daly, supra note 40, at 284-85, where she suggests that the rapid pass'age
of the child abuse reporting laws was due to a combined mass media response to the
problem. This resulted in an outpouring of public attention on the subject which com-
pelled legislatures to enact state reporting laws.
80. D. GIL, supra note 67, at 21-22.
81. California was reputed to have an earlier statute, but it did not specifically
relate to children. The old law required reporting of any injuries by any person in
violation of any penal statute. For a discussion of the 1963 California Act see McCoid,
The Battered Child and Other Assaults Upon the Family: Part One, 50 MINN. L. REV.
1, 21-22 (1965).
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doing so in 1965.82 Some of the laws enacted by state legislatures be-
tween 1963 and 1967 were hastily conceived and reflected public indig-
nation against parents who abused their children. Most of these early
statutes, however, accurately saw the need for protective social services
on behalf of the child victims.83
These laws were characterized by many differences in form and
substance. They also contained many similarities, due in large measure
to suggested legislative guidelines developed by various private and gov-
ernmental agencies which promoted mandatory reporting laws.
The most significant of these model acts which motivated the estab-
lishment of reporting laws was one proposed by the Children's Bureau
of the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare.84
This legislative model acted as a catalyst in encouraging the states to
require mandatory reporting of cases of child abuse." In 1963, the
Children's Division of the American Humane Association promulgated
its own legislative guideline.86 While the Children's Bureau model re-
stricted its mandatory reporting to physicians, the AHA model ex-
tended such reporting of child abuse or neglect to public or private
welfare community agencies.87 Legislative guides were published by
other medical associations during this period, as well. The New York
County Medical Association suggested legislation that would extend
82. D. GIL, supra note 67, at 21-22.
83. Sussman, Reporting Child Abuse: A Review of the Literature, 8 FAM. L. Q.
245, 310 (1974), where it is noted that the main function of the reporting statutes is to
ensure that various social and protective services of the state are activated to treat the
child and the parents while, at the same time, protecting the child from further harm.
But see Fraser, Independent Representation for the Child: The Guardian Ad Litem, 13
CALIF. WESTERN L. REV. 16, 19 (1976), where he asserted that the purpose of the initial
statutes was misleading. The quick identification of abused children by a mandated
group of reporters, the rapid investigation of reported cases, and adequate treatment
being offered all proved to be too simplistic. Fraser concluded:
In short, persons who were mandated to report did not know that they were so
obligated and furthermore, were not aware of child abuse. Many of the persons
who were able to identify the symptoms and knew of their obligation to report,
refused to do so even though a number of states included a criminal provision
for a failure to report. Finally, effective treatment was not available in most
communities.
84. For the text of this model act see McCoid, supra note 81, at 20.
85. Sussman, supra note 83, at 247; see also Paulsen, Child Abuse Reporting
Laws: The Shape of the Legislation, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1967).
86. Child Abuse and Neglect, supra note 1, at 331.
87. Id.
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coverage beyond physicians and hospitals to "persons, firms or corpora-
tions conducting a pharmacy.""
Two newer models have recently been promulgated. The first is the
American Bar Association Juvenile Justice Standards Project, which
developed a Model Child Abusing Report.89 Even though the final draft
of this model act was proposed after the enactment of the 1974 Federal
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act,9" it does not appear to meet
the scope of that Act's requirements. Another recent addition to the list
of model acts is the model developed by the Education Commission of
the States.9 The primary purpose of this model is to offer state legisla-
tures a guideline on how best to meet the broad requirements of the
Federal Act.
A. Federal Legislation
Government at the national level did not become involved in the
welfare of children until 1912, when, after much debate, Congress pro-
mulgated an act which established the United States Children's Bu-
reau.92 This act became law on April 9, 1912, and authorized the estab-
lishment of a bureau which was charged to conduct research and provide
information about children.93 With the passage of the Social Security
Act during President Roosevelt's first term in office in 1935, 91 the fed-
eral government became more directly involved in child welfare serv-
ices.95 The emphasis was placed upon the "protection and care of the
88. For the text of this model act see Daly, supra note 40, at 312-13.
89. ABA, MODEL CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT REPORTING LAW (Jan. 3, 1975).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 5101-06 (Supp. V 1975) [hereinafter referred to as Federal Act].
The House Committee on Education and Labor submitted Report No. 95-609 to the
Committee of the Whole House on September 14, 1977. H.R. 6693, a Bill entitled
"Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Amendments of 1977," passed the House on
September 26, 1977. H.R. 6693 passed the Senate with amendments containing the text
of S. 961 on October 27, 1977, with S. 961 being indefinitely postponed. H.R. 6693, as
amended, extends the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act through the fiscal
year ending September 30, 1982. HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, CHILD
ABUSE PREVENTION AND TREATMENT AMENDMENTS OF 1977, H.R. Rep. No. 609, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977 HOUSE AMENDMENTS].
91. EDUCATION COMMISSION ON THE STATES, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT
MODEL LEGISLATION FOR THE STATES (March 1976).
92. 42 U.S.C. §§ 191-94 (1970).
93. Id. § 192.
94. Ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935)(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1396).
95. Id. § 521(a), 49 Stat. 633 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 721), repealed by Social
27 112:1978
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homeless, dependent and neglected children and children in danger of
becoming delinquent." 96
Congress made significant amendments to the Social Security Act
in 196211 which required each state to make child welfare services avail-
able to all children. It provides the necessary co-ordination between
current child welfare services9" and the social services under the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children program.9 This latter requirement
was to be accomplished by maximizing the use of existing personnel in
providing basic services to those qualified for the programs. This
amendment broadened the definition of "child welfare services" to in-
clude the prevention of child abuse.' °°
Under Title IV-B of the Social Security Act,101 federal funding had
been fixed at $46 to $50 million from 1972 to 1974.102 Of these sums
available for IV-B activities, only $507,000 was spent on activities re-
lated to child abuse. 103 It is clear that the Act purposefully limited itself
to assisting the states through the commitment of funds and research
grants for child welfare programs. Recently, however, the federal gov-
ernment established a mandatory reporting requirement and created a
National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect."0 4
Security Amendments of 1967, § 240, Pub. L. No. 90-248, 81 Stat. 911, 915 (1968).
96. Id.
97. Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, 76 Stat. 172 (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
98. Id. § 102(b), 76 Stat. 182-83 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 723), repealed by Social
Security Amendments of 1967, § 240, Pub. L. No. 90-248, 81 Stat. 911, 915 (1968).
99. Id. § 105(a), 76 Stat. 186-87 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 609).
100. Id. § 102(d), 76 Stat. 184 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 721 & 728, repealed by
Social Security Amendments of 1967, § 240, Pub. L. No. 90-248, 81 Stat. 911 (1968).
See 42 U.S.C. § 625 (1970) for present definition.
101. Title IV-B of the Social Security Act authorizes child welfare programs
including protective services for children. 42 U.S.C. §§ 602-26 (1970), as amended by
Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 412, 86 Stat. 1492, Social
Services Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, §§ 6 & 8, 88 Stat. 2348-49, Fiscal
Year Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 94-273, § 22, 90 Stat. 375.
102. H.R. Rep. No. 685, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2763, 2765.
103. Id.
104. 42 U.S.C. § 5101 (Supp. V 1975). H.R. 6693 would require that the Secre-
tary of Health, Education and Welfare establish research priorities for the making of
grants of contracts. Further, the Secretary would be required to submit proposed priori-
ties to the Federal Register at least 60 days before their establishment, for public
comment. 1977 HousE AMENDMENTS, supra note 90, at 10.
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The Federal Act provides assistance at the national level for the
identification, prevention, and treatment of child abuse and neglect. °"
This legislation went beyond that of a mere reporting statute and
"mandated certain remedial and therapeutic steps be taken upon receipt
of a child abuse report."'0 6 The Federal Act envisions the reporting of
child abuse as the first of a series of steps in a comprehensive plan for
child protection and for the amelioration of the abused child's environ-
ment. Not only does the Federal Act seek to place a greater emphasis
on social worker case work, rather than mere case carrying;0 7 it also
entails having available a trained staff of state and local personnel who
can closely examine every suspected case of child abuse.
The National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect is required to
collect and distribute information on child abuse, and also gather infor-
mation toward an annual survey of child abuse and neglect in the nation.
Federal monies are available for specific purposes, which include project
grants and research contracts designed to assist in the identification,
prevention, and treatment of child abuse and neglect."0 ' These funds may
be spent on demonstration programs and the establishment and mainte-
nance of centers which provide additional counseling services.00
The primary benefits of the Federal Act are directed at the state
level. A grant system has been devised that requires not "less than 5
percent of the monies appropriated in carrying out the Act . . . to go
to the states""' for the purpose of developing, strengthening, and carry-
ing out child abuse prevention treatment programs. The Federal Act
also mandates that not less than fifty per cent of the funds available for
any fiscal year must be spent on grants to and contracts with "public
agencies or nonprofit private organizations (or combinations thereof)
for demonstration programs and projects designed to prevent, identify
105. 42 U.S.C. § 5101-06 (Supp. V 1975).
106. Krause, Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Legislation in Missouri, 42 Mo.
L. REV. 207, 216 (1977).
107. Paulsen, supra note 85, at 3.
108. 42 U.S.C. § 5101(b)-(c) (Supp. V 1975). H.R. 6693 requires that grants made
under the Federal Act may be made for a maximum period of three years. Review of
such grants must be on an annual basis. 1977 HOUSE AMENDMENTS, supra note 90, at
10.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 5103(a)(4)(Supp. V 1975).
110. 42 U.S.C. § 5103(b)(1)(Supp. V 1975). H.R. 6693 would permit up to 30%
of funds appropriated for any fiscal year to be used in the form of grants to the states.
1977 HOUsE AMENDMENTS, supra note 90, at 11.
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and treat child abuse and neglect."''
For a state to qualify for assistance under the Federal Act a number
of rather stringent requirements must be met. These requirements in-
clude:"' (1) implementation of a state program which provides for re-
porting of known or suspected instances of child abuse and neglect; (2)
prompt investigation of reports by properly constituted authorities; (3)
specific administrative procedures and adequate personnel to deal with
child abuse and neglect; (4) immunity provisions for persons reporting
suspected instances of child abuse and neglect so long as such reports
are made in good faith; (5) preservation of the confidentiality of records,
with criminal sanctions being exacted against those who disseminate
such information in an unauthorized manner; (6) co-operation between
agencies dealing with child abuse and neglect cases; (7) public dissemi-
nation of information on the problems, incidence, and other related
information assisting in the identification, prevention, and treatment of
child abuse and neglect; (8) a prohibition against any state cutback in
expenditures appropriated for child abuse and neglect programs below
that of funds designated in fiscal year 1973; and (9) to the extent feasi-
ble, the Federal Act calls for the co-operation of the state agencies with
parental organizations which are combatting child abuse and neglect in
their respective states. The states are also required to appoint a guardian
ad litem to represent an abused or neglected child in a judicial proceed-
ing.113
Even though the Federal Act has been in existence for four years,
not all of the states have been able to comply fully with its provisions
for funding purposes."4 A number of reasons have been cited which
111. 42 U.S.C. § 5103(a)(Supp. V 1975). H.R. 6693 would authorize that pro-
grams "funded under section 4 of the act shall include service programs and projects,
in addition to demonstration programs and projects." This would permit federal support
for direct services to abused children and their families in lieu of grants given strictly
for research and demonstration projects. 1977 HoUSE AMENDMENTS, supra note 90, at
10-11.
112. 42 U.S.C. § 5103(b)(2)(A)-(J)(Supp. V 1975). H.R. 6693 does not address
itself to this section of the Federal Act.
113. Id. § 5103(b)(2)(G) (Supp. V 1975).
114. The following is a list of states eligible for federal monies by fiscal year.
Fiscal Year 1974: Hawaii, New York, Tennessee. Fiscal Year 1975: Arkansas, Connect-
icut, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Utah, Vermont, Virginia. Fiscal Year 1976: Alabama, California,
Delaware*, Kansas, Louisiana*, Michigan*, New Jersey*, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Texas*, Washington*. States with an asterisk have been placed in a conditional grant
2:1978 1
18
Nova Law Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [1978], Art. 3
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol2/iss1/3
Child Abuse-Federal and State Response
make it difficult for the states to comply with the Federal Act." 5 One
is the time-consuming process of making the substantial changes neces-
sary-both administratively and legislatively-to conform their current
operations and state laws to those required under the Federal Act. Some
states have found the guardian ad litem requirement to be a burdensome
demand on their judicial systems."' Other states are having difficulty
with the definition of child abuse because their statutory definitions of
abuse are not as comprehensive as the Federal Act requires." 7
Questions of an individual's right to privacy and the confidentiality
of records have been raised with regard to the establishment of central
registries."' States which have central registries use them to receive
reports of suspected or known instances of abuse or neglect, establish a
tracking system of abused and neglected children and their families, and
provide a statistical profile of the incidence and social characteristics of
those children and their families."' Some experts believe that despite
procedures in many states which require invalid reports to be expunged
from the system, there exists the danger that they may not be. There
also exists the possibility that unauthorized persons may gain access to
the information in the system.'
B. Current Legislative Approaches to Child Abuse-
the State Reporting Statutes
The discovery of the bruised and weighted-down body of three-
year-old Roxanne Felumero in the East River of New York City in 1969
set off a public furor when it was learned that just two months prior to
her death her parents had been brought before the New York Family
Court for alleged abuse and neglect. The judge had released the young
girl back to her parent's custody.'' The inability of the courts to prove
conclusively the criminal act of child abuse can lead to just this type of
category. For full eligibility of federal monies each of these states must submit requested
documentation. 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 397-98.
115. DHEW Regulations Implementing Pub. L. No. 93-247, 45 C.F.R. § 231;
[1977 Documents Binder]; FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 101.0061.
116. 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 182 (statement of Arabella Marti-
nez).
117. 39 Fed. Reg. 43,936 (1974).
118. See text accompanying notes 289-98, infra.
119. See text accompanying notes 184-86, infra.
120. Sussman, supra note 83, at 312.
121. Grumet, supra note 62, at 310.
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unfortunate situation. Protecting a child from abuse is a difficult task,
since the victim of the abuse often will not-or cannot-testify against
his or her assailant. Abuse usually takes place in the privacy of the home
away from public scrutiny, and even when it is reported, it is difficult
to prove in the absence of eyewitnesses. The need to discover and iden-
tify abused children is the primary reason for devising a case-finding
tool such as the reporting laws.
In one form or another all fifty states and the District of Columbia
have child abuse statutes. 22 These laws encourage or require the report-
122. ALA. CODE tit. 27 § 20-25 (Interim Supp. 1975); ALASKA STAT. §§47.17.010
to 17.070 (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1977; ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 13-827, 13-842 (West Supp.
1957-1977), to be renumbered §§ 13-3619 to 13-3622 (effective Oct. 1, 1979); ARK. STAT.
ANN. §§ 42-807 to 818 (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11161.5 to 11162, 273a (Deering
Supp. 1977); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-10-101 to 10-1 15 (Cum. Supp. 1976); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 17-38a to 47 (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1978); DEL. CODE tit. 16, ch. 9
(Revised 1974); D.C. CODE §§ 2-161 to 183 (1973); FLA. STAT. §§ 827.07-.12, as amended
by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.; GA. CODE ANN. §§ 74-109 to 111 (1973 &
Cum. Supp. 1976); HAW. REV. STAT. § 350 (1976); IDAHO CODE §§ 16-1601 to 1630
(Cum. Supp. 1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, §§ 2051-2061 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp.
1977); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 12-3-4.1 to 3-4.1-6 (Bums 1973); IOWA CODE ANN. §§
235A.1-.24 (West 1969 & Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); KAN. STAT. §§ 38-716 to 724 (1973
& Cum. Supp. 1977); Ky. REV. STAT. § 199.335 (1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403
(West 1974 & Cum. Supp. 1977); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 3851-3860 (West
Supp. 1975 & Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A (Replacement
1976 & Cum. Supp. 1977); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, §§ 51A-5IF (West Cum.
Supp. 1977-1978), as amended by 1977 Mass. Legis. Serv. 623 (West); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. §§ 722.621-.636 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
626.556 (West Cum. Supp. 1978), as amended by 1977 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 462-463
(West); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 43-24-1 to 24-9 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§
210.110-.165 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978), §§ 568.050-.060 (Vernon Special Pamphlet
1978, effective Jan. 1, 1979); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 10-1300 to 1322 (Supp. 1977);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1501 to 1508 (1975), to be renumbered §§ 28-1450 to 1457
(effective July 1, 1978); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 200.501-508 (1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 169:37-45 (Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:6-8.8 to 8.73 (West 1976); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 13-14-2, 13-14-3, 13-14-14.1 to 14.2 (Replacement 1976); N.Y. Soc. SERV.
LAW §§ 411-428 (McKinney 1976), as amended by chs. 423, 518 (Consol. 1977); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 110-115 to 122 (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1977); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 50-25.1-
01 to 25.1-14 (Supp. 1977); OHIO REV. CODE § 2151.42.1 (Anderson 1976); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, §§ 843-848 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 418.740-.775
(1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 2201-2224 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); R.I. GEN.
LAWS §§ 40-11-1 to 11-16 (1977); S.C. CODE §§ 20-310 to 310.6 (Cum. Supp. 1975); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS §§ 26-10-10 to 10-15 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1201 (1977); TEX.
FAM. CODE tit. 2, §§ 34.01-.08, 35.04 (Vernon 1975 & Cum. Supp. 1978); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 55-16-1 to 16-7 (1974 & Supp. 1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 1351-1356
(Cum. Supp. 1977); VA. CODE §§ 63.1-248.1 to 248.17 (Cum. Supp. 1977); WASH. REV.
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ing of suspected or known cases of child abuse. Many include criminal
provisions to punish or rehabilitate those who abuse children and estab-
lish or authorize protective services for children.
(1). A SURVEY OF THE REPORTING STkTUTES
The state reporting laws have undergone considerable change in the
past five years. For analysis purposes, each of the state's reporting laws
may be divided in thirteen basic areas of concern. These areas include:
(1) a statement of purpose; (2) definition of abuse and neglect; (3)
mandatory or permissive reporting of suspected cases of child abuse or
neglect; (4) mandatory reporting to a medical examiner or coroner; (5)
authorized reporting procedures; (6) immunity from civil or criminal
prosecution for reporting; (7) sanctions for failure to report; (8) statu-
tory abrogation of privileged communications; (9) temporary protective
custody; (10) evidentiary use of color photographs and x-rays; (11) the
central registry; (12) failure to provide medical care because of religious
beliefs; and (13) the guardian ad litem. The degree of conformity, the
extent of common agreement, the presence or absence of these thirteen
elements, and the strengths and weaknesses of these enactments will be
reviewed.lu
(a). A statement of purpose. The policy of a state regarding a
specific law is usually found in an intent clause which defines the pur-
pose sought to be served by the legislative act. In that statement, the
legislature expresses the ultimate goals and objectives which it believes
the law should achieve. While the purpose does not have the force of
law behind it, it can serve as a guide for interpreting or resolving doubts
created by language found within the law.
Forty-one states include purpose clauses in their reporting stat-
utes, 2 all directed to the necessity of providing protection to the child
CODE ANN. §§ 26.44.010 to 44.080 (Supp. 1976); W. VA. CODE § 49-6-1 to 6-8, 49-6A-
I to 6A-10 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.981 (Cum. Supp. 1977-1978);
Wyo. STAT. §§ 14-21, 14-28.7 to 28.15 (Interim Supp. 1977).
123. This article does not extensively cover the historical development of legisla-
tion in this area. For a thorough discussion of legislative history, see Paulsen, supra note
85, at 1.
124. ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 20(2) (Interim Supp. 1975); ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.010
(1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-827 (West Supp. 1957-1977); COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-
10-102 (Cum. Supp. 1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a (Cum. Supp. 1978);
DEL. CODE tit. 16, § 901 (Revised 1974); D.C. CODE § 2-161 (1973); FLA. STAT. §
12:1978
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and for the prevention of further abuse. These states further provide for
the use of protective services to children.' Twenty-nine states speak to
the non-punitive intent of the law and the desire to preserve the family
unit whenever possible.' Also present in purpose clauses are the kinds
of community resources sought to be marshaled into action on behalf
of abused children. New York calls for the establishment of a child
protection service in each county to investigate reports and provide
protection for the child and rehabilitation for the parents or person
827.07(2), as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.; GA. CODE ANN. § 74-
111 (d) (Cum. Supp. 1976); IDAHO CODE § 16-1601 (Cum. Supp. 1977); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 23 § 2052 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1977); IND. CODE ANN. § 12-3-4.1-1 (Burns
1973); IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A.1 (West 1969); KAN. STAT. § 38-716 (1973); Ky. REV.
STAT. § 199.335(1) (1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403 A (West 1974); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 3851 (West Supp. 1975); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A (Replace-
ment 1976); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.621 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 626.556(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-1300
(Supp. 1977); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.501 (1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169:37 (Supp.
1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.8 (West 1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-2 (Replace-
ment 1976); N.Y. SoC. SERV. LAW § 411 (McKinney 1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-
116 (1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-01 (Supp. 1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2151.42.1 (Anderson 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 845 (Supp. 1977-1978); OR.
REV. STAT. § 418.745 (1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2202 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-
1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-1 (1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1202 (1977); TEx. FAM.
CODE tit. 2, § 34.05 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-16-1 (Supp.
1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7351 (Cum. Supp. 1977); VA. CODE § 63.1-248.1 (Cum.
Supp. 1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.010 (Supp. 1976); W. VA. CODE § 49-
6A-1 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Wyo. STAT. § 14-21 (Interim Supp. 1977).
125. Id.
126. ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.010 (1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a (Cum.
Supp. 1978); DEL. CODE tit. 16, § 901 (Revised 1974); D.C. CODE § 2-161 (1973); FLA.
STAT. § 827.07(2), as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.; GA. CODE ANN.
§ 74-11 l(d) (Cum. Supp. 1976); IDAHO CODE § 16-1601 (Cum. Supp. 1977); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 23, § 2052 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1977); IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A.1 (West
Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); KAN. STAT. § 38-716 (Cum. Supp. 1977); KY. REV. STAT. §
199.335 (1977); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3851 (West Cum. Supp. 1975); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.621 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
621.556(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1978); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.501 (1977); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 169.37 (Supp. 1975); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-2 (Replacement 1976);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-116 (1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.42.1 (Anderson 1976);
OR. REV. STAT. § 418.745 (1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2202 (Purdon Cum. Supp.
1977-1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-1 (1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1202 (1977);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-16-1 (Supp. 1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1351 (Cum. Supp.
1977); VA. CODE § 63.1-248.1 (Cum. Supp. 1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.010
(Supp. 1976); W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-I (Cum. Supp. 1977); WYo. STAT. § 14-21 (Interim
Supp. 1977).
I
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1
acting in loco parentis.2 1 The Louisiana purpose clause directs that its
reporting statute "be administered and interpreted to provide the great-
est possible protection as promptly as possible for such children."'
(b). Definition of abuse and neglect. Since the inception of the
first reporting laws in 1963, the definition of "abuse" has undergone
considerable change. A "child" has been defined as any person under
the age of 18 in forty-seven states,'29 under 17 in one state,' and under
16 in two states.'' New York, until recently, had a dual age require-
ment: it defined an "abused child" as a child under 16 and a "maltreated
child" as a child under 18.132 Some states look to the mental or physical
127. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 411 (McKinney 1976).
128. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403 (1974).
129. ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 20(1)(3) (Interim Supp. 1975); ARiz. REV. STAT. § 13-
842.01(F) (West Supp. 1957-1977); CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (Deering Supp. 1977);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7-102(5) (Cum. Supp. 1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38b
(Cum. Supp. 1978); DEL. CODE tit. 16, § 902 (Revised 1974); D.C. CODE §2-162 (1973);
FLA. STAT. § 827.07(1)(a) (1976); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-11 l(a) (1953); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 350-1 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 16-1601(c) (Cum. Supp. 1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23,
§ 2053 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1977); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-1-3 (Bums Cum. Supp.
1977); IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A.2(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); KAN. STAT. § 38-
722(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977); Ky. REV. STAT. §'2.015 (1971); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
14.403 B(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3852 (West Supp. 1975);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A(b)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
119, § 51A (West. Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.622(a)(West
Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.015 (1971); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-
21-5 (Cum. Supp. 1977); MD. ANN. STAT. § 210.110 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978); MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. § 10-1301(1) (Supp. 1977); NEV. REV. STAT. §200.5011(1) (1977);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169:38 (Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.9 (West 1976);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-3A (Replacement 1976); N.Y. ch. 518, §§ 1-2 (Consol. 1977);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-117(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-02(1)
(Supp. 1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.42.1 (Anderson 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 845 (Supp. 1977-1978); OR. REV. STAT. § 418.740(2) (1977); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 11, § 2203 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-2 (1977); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 26-10-10 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1201 (1977); TEx. FAM.
CODE tit. 2, § 11.01(1) (Vernon 1975); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 55-16-1.5 (Supp. 1977); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 173 (Cum. Supp. 1977); VA. CODE § 63.1-248.2 (Cum. Supp. 1977);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.020 (Supp. 1976); W. VA. CODE § 49-1-2 (Cum.
Supp. 1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.02 (1957). NEB. REV. STAT. § 38.101 (1974) (provides
that any person under the age of 19 is considered a minor).
130. S.C. CODE § 20-310.1(a) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
131. ALASKA STAT. tit. 47, ch. 17.070 (Cum. Supp. 1977); WYo. STAT. § 14-
28.7(a)(ii) (Interim Supp. 1977).
132. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §§ 412(l)-(2) (McKinney 1976). The New York legis-
lature recently enacted a law which defines an abused and neglected child as being under
the age of 18. N.Y. ch. 518, §§ 1-2 (Consol. 1977).
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condition of a person, as well as to that person's age, when declaring a
class of persons to be protected by the reporting law. Washington de-
fines such a class as "any person under the age of 18 years," which
"includes mentally retarded persons, regardless of age."', Another
state includes in its statute "any crippled or otherwise physically or
mentally handicapped child under 21 years who has suffered any wound,
injury, disability, or condition of such a nature as to reasonably indicate
abuse or neglect."' 34
The term "abuse" has been given a wide-ranging meaning under
the reporting statutes. There is much variation in the manner in which
states have chosen to define abuse. The trend nationally has been in the
direction of broadening the definition. In many instances it includes
neglect,3 5 acts of emotional abuse,3 ' and the perpetration of sexual
abuse or molestation. 3 ' A number of states qualify their definition of
abuse by inserting the word "serious" prior to the phrase "physical
injury."' 38 The Colorado, Idaho, and Wyoming statutes define abuse
in very explicit medical terms.3 9 Other states, however, give a broad
definition of what constitutes child abuse. Alaska defines "abuse" as
"the infliction, by other than accidental means, of physical harm upon
the body of a child."4 0 States such as Nebraska also give a broad
definition of abuse, but enumerate specific acts which include:
"tortured, cruelly confined, or cruelly punished"; or "left unattended in
133. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.020(6) (Supp. 1976).
134. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.42.1 (Anderson 1976).
135. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2053 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1977),
which provides a definition of "neglect," as follows:
a failure to provide, by those responsible for the care and maintenance of the
child, the proper and necessary support, education as required by law or medical
or other remedial care, recognized under State law, other care necessary for the
child's well-being; or abandonment by his parent, guardian or custodian; or sub-
jecting a child to an environment injurious to the child's welfare.
136. The language of a number of statutes broadly construes "emotional abuse"
as the endangering of the child's emotional well-being. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. § 38-722
(Cum. Supp. 1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403B(3) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
137. Research in the area of sexual abuse has resulted in an increasing awareness
of this form of physical abuse and the emotional impact it has on young children in
particular. See Sussman, supra note 83, at 254.
138. N.D. CENT. CODE § 50.25.1-02(1) (Supp. 1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §
2203 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978).
139. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-103 (Cum. Supp. 1976); IDAHO CODE § 16-
1602(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977); Wyo. STAT. § 14-28.7(a)(ii)(B) (Interim Supp. 1977).
140. ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.070 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
Nova Law Journal 2:1978 1
24
Nova Law Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [1978], Art. 3
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol2/iss1/3
Child Abuse-Federal and State Response
a motor vehicle, if such minor child is 6 years of age or younger"; or
"sexually abused."''
The Federal Act focuses attention on "child abuse and neglect" as
a unified term and defines this singular phrase as "the physical or
mental injury, sexual abuse, negligent treatment, or maltreatment of a
child under the age of eighteen by a person who is responsible for the
child's welfare under circumstances which indicate that the child's
health or welfare is harmed or threatened."'4 Nineteen states have
followed the lead of the Federal Act in viewing abuse and neglect as
conditions falling along a continuum of maltreatment of children.'
This means that abuse, neglect, sexual abuse, and emotional deprivation
are all considered forms of child maltreatment. When these factors of
abuse are placed along a continuum, they tend to flow one into the other
and lose their distinctive characteristics.'44 Such an approach makes it
easier for social service personnel and the courts to interpret what the
offense perpetrated against a child is on a case by case basis. 5 A
neglected child may also be considered abused, depending upon the
severity of injury involved. Sufficient harm may be evident in instances
where the child suffers severe emotional deprivation, starvation, death
by neglect, or even infant addiction to drugs due to the habit of the
mother.'
A number of states include in their reporting statutes a provision
which recognizes that abuse may not be limited only to individual perpe-
trators.47 To protect children from such institutional abuse, thirteen
141. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1501(3) (1975).
142. 42 U.S.C. § 5102 (Supp. V 1975).
143. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-103(1)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1976); FLA. STAT. §
827.07(1)(b), as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.; HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 350-1 (1976); KAN. STAT. § 38.722 (Cum. Supp. 1977); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 3851
(West Supp. 1975); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51A (West Cum. Supp. 1977-
1978); MoNT. REv. CODES ANN. § 10-1301(2)(a)(b) (Supp. 1977); NEB. REv. STAT. §
28-1501(3) (1975); NEv. REV. STAT. § 200.5011(1) (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.9(a)-
(d) (1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 845 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); OR. REV.
STAT. § 418.740(1) (1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2203 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-
1978); R.I. GEN. LAW § 40-11-2(2) (1977); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-10-10
(1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1202(16) (Supp. 1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-16-1.5
(Supp. 1977); VA. CODE § 63.1-248.2(A) (Cum. Supp. 1977); WASH REV. CODE ANN. §
26.44.020 (Supp. 1976).
144. Friedrich & Borniskin, supra note 40, at 199.
145. Id. at 200.
146. Sussman, supra note 83, at 262.
147. See FLA. STAT. § 827.07(6)(a), as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess.
12:1978
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states provide that when a government agency is accused of abusing a
child an investigation must be conducted by a designated agency other
than the one accused of committing the abusive act. " '
(c). The mandatory or permissive reporting of suspected cases
and neglect. The early reporting statutes almost uniformly limited
reporting of suspected instances of child abuse to physicians. Many of
these statutes were not even mandatory. "9 Those states having permis-
sive reporting statutes generally permitted a physician to make a report
if he felt the need to do so. One writer has noted that in "these cases
• . . the aim is more to protect the physician than the child."'' From
this it would appear that a physician could make a medical judgment
his first concern, rather than the underlying social policy of the report-
ing statutes.'5 ' The argument used by opponents of broad-based manda-
tory reporting rested on two points. First, the physician was usually the
only person to see the child. Second, only a physician had the requisite
medical training to distinguish injuries caused by abuse from those
caused by accidental means. 52 Later statutes uniformly made reporting
mandatory for physicians.5
The trend in defining child abuse has expanded the criteria for
reportable situations as well as the list of professionals who are required
to report. Medical practioners remain the most logical and responsible
group to come in contact with children whose injuries require treatment.
In recent years, the list of mandated reporters has grown steadily from
Law Serv., which provides: "Any report which alleges that an employee or agent of the
department [of Social and Rehabilitative Services] acting in an official capacity, has
committed an act of child abuse shall be investigated by the State Attorney in whose
circuit the alleged act of child abuse occurred."
148. FLA. STAT. § 827.07(l)(b), as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law.
Serv.; HAW. REV. STAT. § 305-1 (1976); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51A (West
Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-1301(2)(a)-(b) (Supp. 1977);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1501(3) (1975); NEv. REV. STAT. § 200.5011(1) (1977); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 9:6-8.9(a)-(d) (West 1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 418.750 (1977); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. I1, § 2203 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-16-3 (Supp.
1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1354 (Cum. Supp. 1977); VA. CODE § 63.1-248.3(A)
(Cum. Supp. 1977); W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-2 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
149. Paulsen, supra note 85, at 7.
150. Daly, supra note 40, at 305.
151. Id.
152. Shepard, The Abused Child and the Law, 22 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 182,
191 (1965).
153. Fraser, A Pragmatic Alternative to Current Legislative Approaches to Child
Abuse, 12 AM. CRIM. L. Q. 103, 109 (1974).
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persons in the medical and related fields to almost everyone connected
in some professional capacity with large numbers of children.", It has
been shown that child abuse is often an on-going trauma and that other
persons besides physicians will come into contact with it.155 One survey
has found physicians and hospitals not to be among the most prolific
of reporters.15 When they do come across instances of child abuse, it is
only after the injuries have become serious enough to warrant emer-
gency medical care. 157
Enlarging the class of reporters results in placing into the legislative
mandate the moral obligation of all persons to come to the assistance
of the protective services of the community where the child is located.
Besides physicians, social service personnel,' teachers,'59 hospital in-
terns and residents, 60 psychologists, 6' osteopaths, 6 ' police officers,1ss
154. Id.
155. Grumet, supra note 62, at 305.
156. The National Clearinghouse on Child Abuse and Neglect, Children's Divi-
sion of the American Humane Association, gathered information on abuse and neglect
reports which were made to the mandated authorities by many agencies and individuals
in the communities. Data on this aspect of the study were grouped as follows:
Percentage
Sources of all reports
Public and private social agencies, schools, school
personnel, police, courts, "hotlines." 39.40%
Neighbors, friends, relatives, siblings. 40.60%
Hospitals, physicians, nurses, coroners, medical
examiners. 9.70%
Others (not specified). 8.50%
1977 House Hearings, supra note 73, at 150.
157. Id.
158. Forty-two states presently specifically mandate social service personnel to
report suspected or known cases of child abuse or neglect. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 27,
§ 21 (Interim Supp. 1975); ALASKA STAT. tit. 47, § 17.020(a)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1977);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-104(2)(m) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
159. Forty-two states require that teachers report any suspected or known cases
of child abuse or neglect. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-808 (1977); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 17-38a (Cum. Supp. 1978); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3853(1) (Cum. Supp.
1977-1978).
160. Thirty-nine states require that hospital interns and residents report suspected
or known cases of child abuse and neglect. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a
(Cum. Supp. 1978); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403 C (1) (West 1974).
161. Twenty states require that psychiatrists and psychologists report suspected
1 2:97
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medical examiners and coroners, " hospitals, 65 clergymen,'66 and law-
yers '6 are also mandated to report instances of child abuse. Twenty-six
states require reporting by "any other person who has cause to believe"
that abuse has occurred." 8 Some states provide for voluntary reports by
or known cases of child abuse or neglect. See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 16, § 902 (Revised
1974); IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A.3(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977-1978).
162. Twenty-two states mandate that osteopaths report suspected or known cases
of child abuse or neglect. See, e.g., ARz. REV. STAT. § 13-842.01A (West Supp. 1957-
1977); HAW. REV. STAT. tit. 20, § 350-1 (1976).
163. Only two states required reporting from law enforcement officials in 1967.
The number increased to 14 in 1973. Sussman, supra note 83, at 272. Twenty-eight
states now require law enforcement officials to report known or suspected cases of child
abuse or neglect. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2054 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp.
1977); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-03(1) (Supp. 1977).
164. Two states required coroners or medical examiners to report known or
suspected cases of child abuse in 1967. The number increased to nine in 1973. Sussman,
supra note 83, at 272. Twenty-four states presently require the reporting of known or
suspected cases of child abuse or neglect by coroners or medical examiners. See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. § 827.07(4)(b), as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.; OR.
REV. STAT. § 418.740(3)(f) (1977).
165. Six states require hospitals to report suspected or known cases of child abuse
or neglect. Other states indirectly require hospitals to report by mandating physicians
on a hospital staff to report to the chief administrator of the hospital in which he is
employed if a case of child abuse is discovered in the hospital. See, e.g., CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(b)-(c) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
166. Clergymen are required to report known or suspected cases of child abuse
or neglect in six states. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.502(2)(b) (1977).
167. Three states require that attorneys report suspected or known cases of child
abuse or neglect. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.502(2)(d) (1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2151.42.1 (Anderson 1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 418.740(3)(m) (1977).
168. ARiz. REV. STAT. § 13-842.01 (West Supp. 1957-1977); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 17-38c (1975); DEL. CODE tit. 16, § 902 (Revised 1974); FLA. STAT. § 827.07(4),
as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.; IDAHO CODE § 16-1619 (Cum.
Supp. 1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2054 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1977); IND. CODE
ANN. § 12-3-4.1-2 (Burns 1973); Ky. REV. STAT. § 199.335(2) (1977); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 35A(e) (Replacement 1976); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-1304 (Supp. 1977);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1502 (1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.502(3) (1977); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 169:40 (Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.10 (West 1976); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 13-14.1A (Replacement 1976); N.Y. SoC. SERV. LAW § 414 (McKinney 1976);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-118(a) (1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-03(2) (Supp. 1977);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-
11-3 (1977); S.C. CODE § 20-310.1(2) (Cum. Supp. 1975); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1203
(Supp. 1977); TEX. FAM. CODE tit. 2, § 34.01 (Vernon 1975); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-
16-2 (Supp. 1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1353 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Wyo. STAT. §
14-28.8(a) (Interim Supp. 1977).
1 40
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any person who has reason to suspect abuse or neglect."6 9 One state
provides that certain designated professional institutional reporters may
make oral reports to department or institution heads. 170
(d). Mandatory reporting to a medical examiner or coroner. It
has been only within the past few years that medical examiners or
coroners have been required to receive reports on suspected instances
of child abuse which result in death. In 1967, only two states required
that reports be made to medical examiners or coroners.' 7' This number
increased to nine states by 1973.171 At the present time, eleven states
require that reports be transmitted to the local medical examiner or
coroner in such instances . 7 The paucity of statutes requiring that re-
ports be made to medical examiners prompted one commentator to note
that even though "death ends the possibility of protecting the particular
child, an investigation of the circumstances and the family may bring
assistance to the remaining children." 74 A nearly uniform provision in
these reporting statutes is the requirement that a medical examiner or
coroner, upon receipt of an abuse case resulting in the death of the
infant, forward all information to the police, state attorney, or responsi-
ble social services agency.'75 This procedure is aimed at ensuringthat
169. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A.3(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978),
which provides that in addition to persons mandated to report, "any other person who
believes that a child has had physical injury inflicted upon him as a result of abuse may
[also] make a report. .. ."
170. VA. CODE § 63.1-248.3 (Cum. Supp. 1977), provides that if information on
child abuse is received by a "teacher, staff member, resident, intern or nurse in the
course of professional services in a hospital, school or similar institution," such person
may "in place of a written report notify the head of the institution or department, who
shall be required to make a report." This statute also provides that any other person
who suspects a case of child abuse has occurred may make a complaint to the appropri-
ate authorities.
171. Sussman, supra note 83, at 272.
172. Id.
173. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-809 (1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-105 (Cum.
Supp. 1976); FLA. STAT. § 827.07(4)(b), as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law
Serv.; KAN. STAT. § 38-721(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
119, § 5 IA (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556(a) (West Cum.
Supp. 1978); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.115(5) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978); N.Y. Soc.
SERV. LAW § 418 (McKinney 1976); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2210 (Purdon Cum. Supp.
1977-1978); W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-3 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Wyo. STAT. § 14-28.9:1
(Interim Supp. 1977).
174. Paulsen, supra note 85, at 12.
175. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 827.07(4)(b), as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla.
Sess. Law Serv., which provides:
2:1978
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child abuse deaths are promptly reported and recognized as such by the
protective services of each community.
(e). Authorized reporting procedures. Many of the child abuse
reporting statutes treat extensively the procedure to be followed by the
state agency receiving a report. The primary receiving agencies involv-
ing instances of child abuse are the police, social services agencies, the
juvenile courts, and the state attorney. In some states a choice in the
order of contacting these agencies is provided to the reporter" 6 Twenty-
six states provide that reports be made initially to law enforcement
officials or police."' One state requires a report to be made to juvenile
courts,'78 while seven other states provide that reports be made to the
state attorney's office. 79 By far the largest recipients of reports are the
Any person required to report or investigate cases of suspected child abuse
or maltreatment, who has cause to suspect that a child has died as a result of
abuse or maltreatment, shall report that fact to the appropriate medical examiner.
The medical examiner shall accept the report for investigation pursuant to §
406.11 and shall report his finding to the police, the appropriate State Attorney,
and the department. Autopsy reports maintained by the medical examiner shall
not be subject to the confidentiality requirement provided for in this section.
176. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1203 (1977), which provides that a reporter
who suspects that an act of child abuse has occurred "shall report such harm immedi-
ately, by telephone or otherwise, to the judge having juvenile jurisdiction or to the
county office of the sheriff or other law-enforcement official of the municipality where
the child resides."
177. ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 21 (Interim Supp. 1975); ALASKA STAT. §
47.17.020(a)(c) (1975); CAL. PENAL CODE § 11161.5(a) (Deering Supp. 1977); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 19-10-104(1) (Cum. Supp. 1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(c)
(Cum. Supp. 1978); DEL. CODE tit. 16, § 903 (Revised 1974); D.C. CODE § 2-161 (1973);
GA. CODE ANN. § 74-111(b) (Cum. Supp. 1976); IDAHO CODE § 16-1619 (Cum. Supp.
1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2057 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1977); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 12-3-4.1-2 (Burns 1973); IowA CODE ANN. § 235A.4(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978);
Ky. REV. STAT. § 199.335(3) (1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403 D (1) (West 1974);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A(d) (Replacement 1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556(3)
(West Cum. Supp. 1978); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1502 (1975); NEv. REV. STAT. §
200.502(1) (1977); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.42.1 (Anderson 1976); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 418.755 (1977); S.C. CODE § 20-310.1(b) (Cum. Supp. 1975); TEx. FAM. CODE tit. 2,
§ 34.02 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-16-3 (Supp. 1977); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.030 (Supp. 1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.98 1(1) (Cum. Supp.
1977-1978); WYo. STAT. § 14-28.9(a) (Interim Supp. 1977).
178. KAN. STAT. § 38-717 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
179. IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A.4(6) (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); KAN. STAT. §
38-717 (Cum. Supp. 1977); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A(d) (Replacement 1976);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 16-1304 (Supp. 1977); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846
(West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-10-12 (1976); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 37-1206(0 (Supp. 1977).
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social services agencies. These agencies are charged by law in forty-eight
states to receive reports on suspected abuse and neglect cases."'0
The designation of the receiving agency is one of the most critical
elements of any reporting statute. The nature and orientation of the
agency first receiving the report will often determine the governmental
response to child abuse. An overwhelming majority of the reporting
statutes emphasize the importance of urgent action in reporting sus-
pected injury.' The next step depends upon what action is taken by the
responsible agency by way of investigating a reported case of child
abuse. The speed with which it acts, how responsibly it provides service,
180. ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.020(a) (1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-842.01(A) (West
Supp. 1957-1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-807(e) (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE § 11161.5(a)
(Deering Supp. 1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-104(1) (Cum. Supp. 1976); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(c) (Cum. Supp. 1978); DEL. CODE tit. 16, § 903 (Revised
1974); D.C. CODE § 2-161 (1973); FLA. STAT. § 827.07(4)-(5), as amended by ch. 77-
429, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.; GA. CODE ANN. § 74-111 (b) (Cum. Supp. 1976); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 350-1 (1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2054 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp.
1977); IND. CODE ANN. § 12-3-4.1-2 (Burns 1973); IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A.4(2) (West
Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); KAN. STAT. § 38-717 (Cum. Supp. 1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:403 D (1) (Cum. Supp. 1977); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3853(1) (Cum. Supp.
1977-1978); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A(d) (Replacement 1976); MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. Ch. 119, § 51A (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
722.623(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556(3) (West Cum.
Supp. 1978); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-11 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
210.115 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-1304 (Supp. 1977);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1504 (1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.502(1) (1977); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 169:41 (Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. §9:6-8.11 (West 1976); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 13-14-14.1 (Replacement 1976); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 414 (McKinney 1976);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-118(a) (1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-04 (Supp. 1977);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.42.1 (Anderson 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846
(West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); OR. REV. STAT. § 418.755 (1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
11, § 2206 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-13.1-3(1) (1977); S.C.
CODE § 20-310.1(b) (Cum. Supp. 1975); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-10-12 (1976);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1203 (Supp. 1977); TEX. FAM. CODE tit. 2, § 34.02 (Vernon Cum.
Supp. 1978); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-16-3 (Supp. 1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1354
(Cum. Supp. 1977); VA. CODE § 63.1-248.6(A) (Cum. Supp. 1977); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 26.44.030 (Supp. 1976); W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-5 (Cum. Supp. 1977); WIs. STAT.
ANN. § 48.981(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); Wyo. STAT. § 14-28.9(a) (Interim Supp.
1977).
181. Language typical of these statutes may be found in the Michigan reporting
statute. MICH. COMP. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 722.623(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978)
provides that a mandated reporter "who has reasonable cause to suspect child abuse or
neglect [shall] immediately, by telephone or otherwise . . . make an oral report, or
cause an oral report to be made. . ....
1 2:1978
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and its interpretation of what is expected of it bear directly on the degree
of protection which the reporting statute makes available to abused
children.
The immense importance of these two considerations is acknowl-
edged by one commentator:
This is the most sensitive area of the whole discussion of reporting legisla-
tion. Yet, analysis shows that this is the most confused in terms of legisla-
tive action. A critical determination for the lawmakers is the decision
about which resource to designate for receiving reports of child abuse. On
this important decision rests the effectiveness of the reporting law with
respect to achieving the appropriate goals. The right choice will bring into
play the appropriate resources. A poor, or bad choice may produce re-
sults not contemplated by the law. It is possible, therefore, for the legisla-
tive intent to fail if the tools prescribed to accomplish the goal are inade-
quate or unsuited for the job.'
A consensus among experts in the medical, legal, and social fields
concludes that the existing social services agencies or more specialized
offices of child protective services within these agencies should be re-
sponsible for receiving reports.183 This preference is based upon the
assumption that some type of protective service or treatment will be
provided once the initial report is made.
A typical statute requiring reports to be made to a receiving agency
calls for an oral report first to be made, either in person or by tele-
phone.184 A follow-up written report may be required if the receiving
agency requests it.18s This dual-use reporting procedure allows for speed-
ier attention to the child's problem yet offers a permanent record which
182. DeFrancis, The Status of Child Protective Services, in HELPING THE BAT-
TERED CHILD & HIS FAMILY 127, 140 (Kempe & Heifer eds. 1972): See also Sussman,
supra note 83, at 280.
183. Sussman, supra note 83, at 285.
184. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-812(b) (1977) provides that such reports include
the names and addresses of the child and his parents or other persons responsible
for his care, if known; the child's age, sex, and race; the nature and extent of the
child's injuries, sexual abuse or negect, including any evidence of previous injuries,
sexual abuse or neglect, if known; the composition of the family; the source of
the report; the person making the report, his occupation and where he can be
reached; and the action taken by the reporting source.
185. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 827.07(5), as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess.
Law Serv.; MICH. COMP. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 722.623(l)-(5) (West Cum. Supp. 1977-
1978).
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can be relied upon during the investigation. The oral report is usually
restricted to the essential facts necessary for the receiving agency to
gauge whether a condition of child abuse or neglect exists. 8 Being
unencumbered by an overwhelming amount of paperwork, the receiving
agency is able to screen the reports coming in for likely cases of abuse
requiring immediate attention. The amount of time saved in processing
is another key factor which allows for a quick response in emergency
situations. A number of statutes provide 24-hour telephone monitoring
service seven days a week to receive (usually toll free) reports of sus-
pected abuse.' n
(f). Immunity from civil or criminal prosecution for
reporting. An essential element in the success of a reporting statute is
the active co-operation and participation of those mandated by it to
report known or suspected cases of abuse or neglect. Civil and criminal
immunity are offered by the vast majority of reporting statutes.'88 It
would be wholly unrealistic to expect such active co-operation without
some degree of immunity from criminal and civil prosecution. Com-
mentators agree that there is need for some type of immunity to protect
mandated reporters from prosecution.' 9 To encourage those individuals
not mandated to report, it has been urged that immunity should be
extended to them, as well."'
The Federal Act requires that reporting statutes include an immun-
ity provision "for persons reporting instances of child abuse and neglect
from prosecution, under any state or local law, arising out of such
reporting."'' "Good faith clauses" in immunity provisions have been
used by state legislatures to ensure that reports are not made mali-
ciously.'92 This good faith requirement is strengthened in fourteen states
186. Child protective agencies follow a fairly standard procedure in handling
cases. There is an initial intake process that involves limited screening and case assign-
ment within the agency. During the intake process, the social service worker may decide
that no further action can be taken; the report may not present sufficient information
to be investigated-such as a report that does not identify the name and address of the
family of the allegedly abused child.
187. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 827.07(7), as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess.
Law Serv.; IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A(l)-(3) (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978).
188. Fraser, supra note 153, at Ill.
189. See, e.g., Grumet, supra note 62, at 306.
190. Paulsen, The Law and Abused Children, in THE BATTERED CHILD 174 (Hel-
fer & Kempe eds., 2d ed. 1974).
191. 42 U.S.C. § 5103(b5(2)(A) (Supp. V 1975).
192. ARIz. REv. STAT. § 13-842.01(D) (West Cum. Supp. 1957-1977). The Ari-
zona statute provides:
2:1978
33
et al.: The Federal and State response to the Problem of Child maltreatme
Published by NSUWorks, 1978
by the inclusion of a "presumption of good faith" in their statutes.'
Such a presumption places the burden of proving lack of good faith
upon the instigator of any suit.
The medical profession, a special target group in the law, thinks
itself particularly vulnerable to lawsuits without such protection.194 The
threat or even remote possibility of long and drawn-out legal battles
inhibits necessary reporting. Thus, the inclusion of immunity provides
some freedom to physicians from fear of retaliation by angry parents.
One commentator has noted that such immunity provisions may be
beneficial to the public in general and to physicians in particular
"simply because they exist and can be publicized." '195 Such a provision
may also tend to discourage lawsuits by plaintiffs hoping to gain finan-
cial reward over their own wrongdoing, should insufficient proof be
offered at trial to convict them.
(g). Sanctions for failure to report. Sanctions exacted against a
mandated reporter who fails to report a case of child abuse are included
in the reporting statutes of many states. Thirty-three states at present
impose some form of penal sanctions or fines upon those persons who
are mandated to report instances of child abuse but willfully fail to do
so. ' The criminal penalties imposed upon those who fail to report range
Anyone participating in the making of reports required under the provisions
of this section, or anyone participating in a judicial proceeding resulting from
such reports, shall be immune from any civil or criminal liability by reason of
such action unless such person acted with malice or unless such person has been
charged with or is suspected of abusing or neglecting the child or children in
question.
See also ALASKA STAT. tit. 47, § 17.050 (1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(h)
(Cum. Supp. 1978); HAW. REV. STAT. § 350-1 (1976).
193. ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 23 (Interim Supp. 1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-814
(1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-110 (Cum. Supp. 1976); FLA. STAT. § 827.07(10), as
amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2059
(Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1977); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3856 (West Supp.
1975); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 722.625 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 43-21-11 (Cum. Supp. 1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-14.2B (Replacement
1976); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 419 (McKinney 1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-09
(Supp. 1977); PA. STAT. tit. 11, § 2211 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 37-1210 (Supp. 1977); Wyo. STAT. § 14-28.11 (Interim Supp. 1977).
194. Paulsen, supra note 85, at 31.
195. Id. at 32.
196. ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 25 (Interim Supp. 1975); ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-
842.01(D) (West Supp. 1957-1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-816(a) (1977); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 11162 (Deering Supp. 1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(b) (Cum. Supp.
1978); DEL. CODE tit. 16, § 908 (Revised 1974); FLA. STAT. § 827.07(14)(a), as amended
146
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from five days in jail 97 to one year in prison. 9 8 fines may also be exacted
against willful violators. These range from $25111 to $1,000.20 One com-
mentator believes that it is not statutorily prudent to expose one's pro-
fessional judgment to the ravages of criminal prosecution, even though
such sanctions are placed in the context of a civil statute.20 He believes
that such a penalty provision is virtually unenforceable and, as such, is
useless.2 12 This is highlighted by the fact that regardless of the severity
of the penalty, action against the physician does little to aid the abused
child.
The reporting statutes reflect a difference in philosophy regarding
how best to encourage persons required to report to make reports. One
philosophy advocates the inclusion of a penalty clause in the belief that
no action can be mandated by law without also providing a penalty for
failure to comply therewith.203 Proponents of the other philosophy be-
lieve that the main problem is one of education. Their argument is that
when people are made aware of the extent of the problem, and are
informed that they are mandated to report, the problem will solve itself.
A mandated reporter who willfully fails to report an instance of
child abuse may be liable for damages in a civil suit.11 Robinson v.
by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.; IND. CODE ANN. § 12-3-4.1-2(b) (Burns 1973);
IOWA CODE ANN. §235A.9(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); KAN. STAT. § 38-720
(Cum. Supp. 1977); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:403 I (West 1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, § 3856 (West Supp. 1975); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51A (West Cum.
Supp. 1977-1978), as amended by 1977 Mass. Legis. Serv. 623 (West); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 210.165 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1508 (1975); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 200.507 (1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169:45 (Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:6-8.14 (West 1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-14.IC (Replacement 1976); N.Y. Soc.
SERV. LAW § 420(1) (McKinney 1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-13 (Supp. 1977);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
II, § 2212 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); S.C. CODE § 20-310.5 (Cum. Supp. 1975);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-10-10 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1212 (Supp. 1977);
TEX. FAM. CODE tit. 2, § 34.07 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-16-
6 (1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1353 (Cum. Supp. 1977); VA. CODE § 63.1-248.3
(Cum. Supp. 1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.080 (Supp. 1976); W. VA. CODE §
49-6A-8 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.981(3) (Cum. Supp. 1977-1978).
197. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. § 38-720 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
198. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.165 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978).
199. Id.
200. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-14.1(C) (Replacement 1976).
201. Shepard, supra note 152, at 192.
202. Id.
203. See McCoid, supra note 81, at 27.
204. Paulsen, supra note 85, at 36. Paulsen notes that "it seems likely that report-
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Wical °5 concerned a suit brought on behalf of a child against four
doctors and the local police for failure to report and investigate the
report adequately. The child had been taken to the defendant doctors
on a number of occasions for treatment of injuries later shown to have
been the result of abuse."' The doctors acknowledged that they surmised
the injuries to have been caused by such abuse. Nevertheless, they al-
lowed the child to be returned to his mother after each visit for treat-
ment. The suit was based on the theory of negligence per se. It was
argued that the defendants had a statutory duty to report all known or
suspected cases of child abuse or neglect to the proper authorities. The
injured child alleged that the doctors breached their legally mandated
duty to report and that he was a member of the class intended by the
legislature to be protected by the statute. Prior to trial, the defendants
agreed to pay $600,000 as a settlement to the child.
In Landeros v. Flood,"' a guardian ad litem2 8 brought suit on
behalf of a child against a physician and a hospital for negligently failing
to diagnose her abused condition and for negligently failing to report
her injuries to the proper authorities. As a result of such negligence, it
was alleged, she suffered permanent physical injuries and mental dis-
tress. California's reporting statute required physicians to report instan-
ces of physical injuries to children which appear to have been inflicted
by other than accidental means.2"9 In addition to the common law negli-
gence, the plaintiff alleged failure to comply with the mandatory report-
ing laws.
ing statutes which require reporting and which carry criminal penalties create a cause
of action in favor of infants who suffer abuse after a physician has failed to make a
report respecting earlier abuse brought to his attention."
One state even provides for punitive damages. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556(5)
(Cum. Supp. 1978). The Minnesota statute provides for punitive damages being exacted
against a person who either willfully or recklessly makes a false report under the statute,
as well as for actual damages in a civil suit.
205. C.A. No. 37607 (Cal. Sup. Ct.)(San Luis Obispo, filed Sept. 4, 1970).
206. The child had whip marks on his back, puncture wounds in the neck, and
burned finger tips. He was found with strangulation marks and was not breathing. Even
though his breathing was restored, the brain had been without oxygen for so long that
he became mentally retarded due to extensive brain damage. TIME, Nov. 20, 1972, at
74 (col. 2).
207. 17 Cal. 3d 399, 551 P.2d 389, 131 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1976).
208. For a discussion of the responsibilities of a guardian ad litem, see text
accompanying notes 323-29, infra.
209. CAL. PENAL CODES § 11161.5 (Deering Supp. 1977).
2:1978 1
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The plaintiff appealed an order dismissing her complaint to the
California Supreme Court. The first question the count addressed was
whether the physician should be held to a standard of care which in-
cluded knowing how to diagnose and treat the "battered child syn-
drome." 1 Citing People v. Jackson,11 the court stated that testimony
of a physician identifying the battered child syndrome was admissible.2 12
The court recognized that the battered child syndrome had become an
accepted medical diagnosis; 213 however, it did not possess the requisite
medical knowledge to render a decision, as a matter of law, on the
issue.24 The court stated that the question was one of fact and must be
based on expert testimony.25
The defendants contended that the injuries suffered by the child
after her release were not proximately caused by their failure to diag-
'nose and report her condition.21 6 However, the court held that proximate
cause was a question of fact and turned on whether the defendants could
reasonably have foreseen further injury to the child.1 7
The court went on to find that the plaintiff's allegation of statutory
negligence for failure to report was but an alternative theory of recovery
for a single cause of action .2 1 The mandatory reporting statute was
strictly construed by the court: to constitute a violation of the statute it
must actually have appeared to the physician that the child had been
abused. For the plaintiff to prevail on the count of statutory negligence,
she must prove that "defendant Flood actually observed her injuries and
formed the opinion they were intentionally inflicted on her.' 219
Such a subjective standard requiring actual knowledge in order to
show statutory negligence makes a plaintiffs case more difficult to
prove. An argument can be made for the inclusion of an objective
standard in the penalty clause of a reporting statute. 2 1 Simply put, the
subjective standard will vitiate the intent of child abuse legislation by
210. 551 P.2d at 393.
211. 18 Cal. App. 3d 504, 95 Cal. Rptr. 919 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
212. 551 P.2d at 393.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 394.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 395.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 396.
219. Id. at 397-98.
220. Note, Negligence-Malpractice-Physician's Liability for Failure to Diag-
nose and Report Child Abuse, 23 WAYNE L. REv. 1187, 1198 (1977).
! i
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ensuring that any harm suffered by a child in violation of the statute
will give rise to a viable claim for civil damages.
(h). Statutory abrogation of privileged communications. In
many instances of child abuse, the only eyewitnesses are the parents and
the child, and the child may either be too young or too intimidated to
testify. 2' To encourage the disclosure of evidence of abuse, many of the
reporting statutes abrogate a number of privileges pertaining to the
exclusion of confidential communications. A typical statutory exception
provides:
The physician-patient privilege, husband-wife privilege, or any privilege
except the attorney-client privilege . . . provided for or covered by law,
both as they relate to the competency of the witness and to the exclusion
of confidential communications, shall not pertain in any civil or criminal
litigation in which a child's neglect, dependency, abuse or abandonment
is in issue or in any judicial proceedings resulting from a report submitted
pursuant to this section.22
The privileges given to the physician-patient and husband-wife relation-
ships fall by the wayside when a statutory exception abrogates them.
One commentator has noted that the physician-patient privilege did
not exist at common law and never existed in the United Kingdom,
contrary to what was generally believed.12 1 This evidentiary privilege
was not established in the United States until 1828.24 A small minority
of states retain the privileged status of confidential communications in
any professional or personal relationship even when the communication
involves child abuse or neglect.22 At the present time, forty-three states
have enacted legislation waiving this privilege, 26 which is an increase of
221. See text accompanying notes 67-78, supra.
222. FLA. STAT. § 827.07(10), as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law
Serv.
223. Sussman, supra note 83, at 297.
224. Id.
225. These states are Georgia and Maine.
226. ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 24 (Interim Supp. 1975); ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.060
(1975); ARiz. REV. STAT. § 13-842.01(D) (West Supp. 1957-1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. §
42-815 (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE § 11161.6 (Deering Supp. 1977); DEL. CODE tit. 27, §
907 (Revised 1974); D.C. CODE § 2-165 (1973); FLA. STAT. § 827.07(1 1), as amended
by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.; HAW. REV. STAT. § 350-5 (1976); IDAHO CODE
§ 16-1601 (Cum. Supp. 1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2060 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp.
1977); IND. CODE ANN. § 12-3-4.1-5 (Burns 1973); IOWA CODE ANN. 235A.8 (West
Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); Ky. REV. STAT. § 199.335(7) (1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
2:1978 1
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nine states since 1968.117
Even without the existence of such a statutory exception, it is
doubtful whether a parent could invoke the child patient's privilege (on
the theory that the rights of a minor vest in its parents), particularly
when the privilege is used as a shield for the person accused of injuring
the child in the first place.28 Another reason why a court would proba-
bly disallow the privilege is the fact that such a privilege is meant to
ensure that the best interests of the child be maintained. Allowing the
privilege to stand would not work to the child's best interest. 29
The Supreme Court of Washington, in State v. Fagalde, 2 3 ruled
on the applicability of conflicting state statutes as to whether
psychiatrist-patient communications were considered privileged pertain-
ing to evidence entered at trial. The evidence at issue stated that the
defendant had revealed his hostility to the abused child and that he had
physically assaulted the child. The young boy had been taken to a
nearby hospital where an examination revealed that he had suffered a
broken leg. Before this incident took place, the defendant had twice
sought counseling at a mental health center and had spoken of his
hostility with a psychologist. The defendant argued on appeal that there
was a statute which maintained the confidentiality of the psychiatrist-
patient relationship.23' The court rejected the defendant's argument
14:403 F (West 1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3856-A (West Cum. Supp. 1977-
1978); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A(h)(2) (Replacement 1976); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 119, § 51A (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §722.631
(West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556 (West Cum. Supp. 1978);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.140 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-
1307 (Cum. Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1503 (1975); NFv. REV. STAT. § 200.506
(1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169.43 (Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.46 (West
1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-4.2A (Replacement 1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-
121 (1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-10 (Cum. Supp. 1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2151.42.1 (Anderson 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 848 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-
1978); OR. REV. STAT. § 418.775 (1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2222(2) (Purdon Cum.
Supp. 1977-1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-11 (1977); S.C. CODE § 20-310.3 (Cum.
Supp. 1975); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-10-15 (Supp. 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-
1211 (Supp. 1977); TEx. FAM. CODE tit. 2, § 34.04 (Vernon 1975); UTAH CODE ANN. §
55-16-5 (1974); VA. CODE § 63.1-248.11 (Cum. Supp. 1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
26.44.060(3) (Supp. 1976); W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-7 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Wyo. STAT. §
14-28.12 (Interim Supp. 1977).
227. Daly, supra note 40, at 330.
228. Sussman, supra note 83, at 298.
229. Krause, supra note 106, at 259.
230. 85 Wash. 2d 730, 539 P.2d 86 (1975).
231. 539 P.2d at 88-89.
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that confidential communications between the perpetrator and a psy-
chologist-a doctor, or a mental health employee-"are protected from
disclosure and privileged in a judicial proceeding according to the terms
of the applicable statutes.""23 The court interpreted the intent of the
legislature as having attached a greater importance to the "reporting of
incidents of child abuse and the prosecution of perpetrators than to
counseling and treatment of persons whose mental or emotional prob-
lems cause them to inflict such abuse. '12a
Such an exception to the privilege may also act to relieve the medi-
cal profession from legal or ethical restrictions against revealing confi-
dential information. One commentator has noted that the physician-
patient waiver "is likely to encourage reporting from a profession which
has a history steeped with protection of confidential communica-
tions. 9234
There exists in many states a privilege similar to that of physician-
patient between a husband and wife. Neither may divulge information
damaging to the other in any criminal procedure without the release of
the spouse against whom the evidence is being given. As this privilege
existed at common law, it must be specifically excluded by statute. 25
The number of states allowing the waiver of this privilege has steadily
increased from only twenty in 1968236 to thirty-two in 1974. 237 Thirty-
nine states now statutorily abrogate the privilege. 8 The reason for this
232. Id. at 90.
233. Id.
234. Daly, supra note 40, at 330.
235. Id. at 331.
236. Sussman, supra note 83, at 299.
237. Id. at 299.
238. ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 24 (Interim Supp. 1975); ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.060
(1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-842.01(D) (West Supp. 1957-1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. §
42-815 (1977); DEL. CODE tit. 27, § 907 (Revised 1974); D.C.CoDE § 2-165 (1973); FLA.
STAT. § 827.07(11), as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.; HAW. REV.
STAT. § 350-5 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 16-1601 (Cum. Supp. 1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
23, § 2060 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1977); IND. CODE ANN. § 12-3-4.1-5 (Burns 1973);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A.8 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); KY. REV. STAT. § 199.335(7)
(1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403 F (West 1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §
3856-A (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51A (West
Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.631 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-
1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556 (West Cum. Supp. 1978); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
210.140 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-1307 (Cum. Supp.
1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1503 (1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.506 (1977); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 169.43 (Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.46 (West 1976); N.M. STAT.
1 52
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waiver is primarily that often the parents know the cause of the injuries
suffered by the child. To permit the abusive parent to injure the child
and then cause the other parent to remain silent by invoking the privi-
lege is tantamount to encouraging further abuse of the child.- 9 This
would allow the privilege to become a shield for the abusive parent in
much the same manner that the physician-patient privilege could be
used to muzzle the physician and prevent him from reporting what he
had seen.
Waiving the attorney-client privilege presents obvious problems to
a client, should his confidences be betrayed by the very person entrusted
to keep them. If such confidences were to be made known in court
without his consent, it would amount to no less than an abrogation of
his right to a fair hearing. Two states have waiver statutes which con-
ceivably can be construed to abrogate the traditional attorney-client
relationship.20 The Alabama statute provides that "[t]he doctrine of
privileged communications shall not be a ground for excluding any
evidence regarding a child's injuries or the cause thereof.' 41 Nevada
makes inapplicable in abuse cases "all privileges against disclosure rec-
ognized by Nevada law. 242 An attempt actually to waive such a privi-
lege in either state would raise serious questions relating to the desirabil-
ity of such clauses and, perhaps, even raise a question as to their consti-
tutionality. That such an exception is permitted by any statute appears
to fly in the face of Canon 27 of the American Bar Association's Code
of Professional Ethics, which provides in part:
It is the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's confidences. This
duty outlasts the lawyer's employment. . . . A lawyer should not con-
tinue employment when he discovers that his obligation prevents the
performance of his full duty to his former or to his new client ...
ANN. § 13-14-4.2A (Replacement 1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-121 (1975); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 50-25.1-10 (Cum. Supp. 1977); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 848 (West Cum.
Supp. 1977-1978); OR. REv. STAT. § 418.775 (1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2222(2)
(Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-11 (1977); S.C. CODE § 20-
310.3 (Cum. Supp. 1975); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-10-15 (Supp. 1977); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 37-1211 (Supp. 1977); TEX. FAm. CODE tit. 2, § 34.04 (Vernon 1975); VA. CODE
§ 63.1-248.11 (Cum. Supp. 1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.060(4) (Supp. 1976);
W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-7 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Wyo. STAT. § 14-28.12 (Interim Supp.
1977).
239. Friedrich & Borniskin, supra note 40, at 203.
240. These states are Alabama and Nevada.
241. ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 24 (Interim Supp. 1975).
242. NEv. REV. STAT. § 200.506 (1977).
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If a lawyer is accused by his client, he is not precluded from disclos-
ing the truth in respect to the accusation. The announced intention of a
client to commit a crime is not included within the confidences which he
is bound to respect. He may properly make such disclosure as may be
necessary to prevent the act or protect those against whom it is threat-
ened.24
3
A difficult question to resolve arises if a lawyer receives information
concerning past instances of child abuse which leads him to an inference
of continuing abuse. This leads to the possibility of preventing further
abuse by disclosing such facts to the proper authorities.244 One legal
commentator believes that
it may be less clear that the obligation of confidentiality does not exist
where the attorney or any other counsellor is not being consulted in
relation to the possibility of future abuse and when he is not being asked
to assist in concealment of the abuse of the child.245
Another privilege to be considered is the social worker-client rela-
tionship. Most states do not consider this relationship to be a confiden-
tial one.246 A New York statute does not consider communications be-
tween parent and counselor to be confidential if the communication by
the parent reveals the contemplation of a crime or harmful act.247 An
Illinois appellate court held that an Illinois statute which prohibits so-
cial workers from disclosing information they have gained from persons
consulting with them in their professional capacity does not prevent
social workers from testifying as to information gained from investigat-
ing child abuse cases.248 By disclosing information obtained by investi-
gating cases of child abuse, social workers are attempting to prevent
further abuse. To prohibit such disclosure would effectively frustrate the
social worker's duty of protecting the child. 249
(i). Temporary protective custody. A typical method of dealing
243. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 37.
244. McCoid, supra note 81, at 31.
245. Id.
246. Sussman, supra note 83, at 299.
247. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 4508 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1977-1978).
248. In re Pitts, 44 Ill. App. 3d 46, 357 N.E.2d 872 (3d Dist. App. Ct. 1976). The
statute being attacked as unconstitutional is ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 5320 (Smith-Hurd
1968).
249. 357 N.E.2d at 874.
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with the problem of child abuse is to remove the child from the custody
of the abusing parents either temporarily or permanently. There are two
kinds of temporary protective custody: retention of the child in a medi-
cal facility and removal of the child from its home environment. With
regard to the custody of a child, one statute provides:
Any person in charge of a hospital or similar institution or any physician
treating a child may keep the child in his custody without consent of the
parents or guardian, whether or not additional medical treatment is re-
quired, if the circumstances or conditions of the child are such that con-
tinuing in his place of residence or in the care or custody of the parent,
guardian, custodian or other person responsible for the child's care pres-
ents an imminent danger to the child's life or health. 5'
The right of a physician or the chief administrative officer of a hospital
or similar institution to retain custody of a child in his care is beginning
to gain wide acceptance. In statutes which include the word "health" in
the phrase "in imminent danger to the child's life or health," the stan-
dard to be met is that if the child were released, he might suffer further
injury.251 It is the intent of these statutes to give physicians and medical
institutions some flexibility in dealing with what they feel to be a poten-
tially hazardous home environment for the child. To ensure that this
custodial detention is actually temporary, statutory provisions delineate
the length of detention without an authorized judicial proceeding. Four
states require that a court order be secured prior to any attempt to
remove the child from the custody of parents or guardian.252 Ten states
provide for protective custody until social services or the police can take
over. 2  Nine states provide that social services may assume protective
250. FLA. STAT. § 827.07(6), as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.
251. See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 417(1) (McKinney 1976); VA. CODE §
63.1-248.9(A) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
252. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403G(6) (West 1974). The Louisiana statute
provides that the child welfare unit "shall request the juvenile court or other court
exercising juvenile jurisdiction to issue an instanter order for the temporary removal and
placement of the child pending completion of the investigation and disposition of the
case." See also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 5 I(C) (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978);
S.C. CODE § 20-310.2 (Cum. Supp. 1975); W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-9 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
253. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2055 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1977); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, § 35A(f)(l) (Replacement 1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-1 18(d) (Cum.
Supp. 1977); OHIo REV. CODE § 2151.42.1 (Anderson 1976); OR. REV. STAT. §
418.760(3) (1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2208(b) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-5 (1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.056 (Supp. 1976);
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custody of a child when there exists a real danger to the child's well-
being. 54 Four of these states also require that a court order be secured
by the next regularly scheduled day to permit further detention of the
child. 55 Two states allow a child to remain in temporary protective
custody for ninety-six hours or longer.256 Three states permit a maxi-
mum period of forty-eight hours before the retention agency must apply
for a court order to maintain the child in temporary custody. 57 Nineteen
states provide that a treating physician, hospital, or similar institution
may keep a child for a limited amount of time even though the child is
not in need of immediate hospital care.58
These statutes also require that a reasonable effort be made to
notify the parents or guardian that the child has been placed under
temporary protective custody." 9 The placement of a child in a protective
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 48.981(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); Wyo. STAT. § 14-28.9:2(a)
(Interim Supp. 1977).
254. ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.030(b) (1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(e)
(Cum. Supp. 1978); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A(f-1) (Replacement 1976); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 210.125 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 417(1) (McKinney
1976); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2208(2) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 50-25.1-06 (Supp. 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1204 (1977); TEx. FAM. CODE
tit. 2, § 17.01 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978).
255. Missouri, New York, Tennessee, Pennsylvania.
256. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(c) (Cum. Supp. 1978); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 50.25.1-07 (Supp. 1977).
257. IDAHO CODE § 16-1612 (Cum. Supp. 1977); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-
1309(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-5 (1977).
258. ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 22(1) (Interim Supp. 1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-811
(1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(d) (Cum. Supp. 1978); FLA. STAT. §
827.07(6)(b), as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.; ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 25, § 2055 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1977); Ky. REv. STAT. § 199.335(4) (1977);
MICH. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 722.626(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 210.125(3) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.16 (West 1976); N.Y.
Soc. SERV. LAW § 417(1) (McKinney 1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 118(d) (Cum. Supp.
1977); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50.25.1-07 (Supp. 1977); OHIO REv. CODE § 2151.42.1
(Anderson 1976); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2208(2) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-5 (1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1204 (1977); TEX. FAM. CODE
tit. 2, § 35.04 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.056 (Supp.
1976); WYo. STAT. § 14-28.9:2(b) (Interim Supp. 1977).
259. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 827.07(6)(b), as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla.
Sess. Law Serv.; MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A(j)(1)-(3) (Cum. Supp. 1977). The
Maryland reporting statute has attempted to alleviate the constitutional issue of paren-
tal due process rights by statutorily providing rules and regulations protecting the rights
of suspected child abusers. Among these are: notice to the person suspected of being an
abuser prior to his name being entered in the state central registry; a guaranteed right
2:1978 1
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retention situation has been described as a "possibly dangerous but
necessary legal tool." ' One commentator notes that those social serv-
ices agencies which provide child protective services usually carry out
"aggressive social casework techniques." '81 Since these agencies fre-
quently reach out into the lives of those individuals who come within
the scope of their operations without being asked, the statutory tool of
protective custody is extremely susceptible to misuse. 62 Another com-
mentator believes that the temptation to misuse this legal device is too
great to allow its unbridled use.283 He feels that only a social services
agency should be permitted to remove the child, and only if it first
secures a court order allowing the retention of the child. 64
The argument against the protective removal of an abused child is
similar to the one against his temporary retention: "the protection of
children cannot, and need not, be accomplished at the expense of violat-
ing fundamental rights of parents. 2 5 There must be some entity be-
tween the parent and the person having taken custody of the child. This
entity must be the courts or a statutorily appointed authority which will
secure the parent's basic rights.266 A court order provides the necessary
separation of interest between the rights of parents and the possible
intemperate or inexperienced actions by the agencies or individuals who
have the child in protective custody.2 7 The District Court for the South-
ern District of Texas in Sims v. State Department of Public Welfare"6
stated that removal of a child without notice from his home environment
can take place only if there exists an "immediate threat to the safety of
the child.' 2 9 Even so, some standards of due process must still be recog-
nized. The court also held that the state may not "retain custody of a
child for more than ten days Fithout a complete adversary hearing with
of appeal upon request by the suspected abuser pertaining to whether his name shall
remain in the central registry; and limiting names entered in the central registry to
persons adjudicated as abusers.
260. Sussman, supra note 83, at 291.
261. Paulsen, supra note 85, at 46.
262. Id. at 46.
263. McCoid, supra note 81, at 49-50.
264. Id. at 50.
265. Krause, supra note 106, at 243.
266. McCoid, supra note 81, at 55.
267. V. DEFRANCIS, CHILD ABUSE LEGISLATION IN THE 1970's 184 (American
Humane Assoc., Children's Div. 1974).
268. 438 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D. Tex. 1977) [hereinafter referred to as Sims v. State].
269. Id. at 1192.
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notice to the parents. ' 2 ° The running of this period would begin with
the day of the service, not the day of the initial orders permitting seizure;
the burden is on the state to make a clear showing that further custody
of the child is necessary to protect the child from harm.
27
'
The argument for removal of the child from his home environment
is particularly strong when the child has been physically abused. There
exists a real threat of harm to the child if he is left in a home environ-
ment which has already caused him physical harm. 2 2 One commentator
has noted that there exists from between a 20% to 30% chance of perma-
nent injury or even death should a child be returned to his home environ-
ment. 3 Another commentator places the injury rate at over 50%.274
(j). Evidentiary use of color photographs and x-rays. Even
though the statutory trend in mandatory categories of persons required
to report instances of child abuse is expanding, the physician is probably
best able to discover the evidence of multiple injuries in various stages
of healing which might be identified as constituting the "battered child
syndrome.'275 A physician is able to undertake certain tests to determine
the extent and probable cause of the injuries inflicted upon the child.
The statutes of eighteen states authorize the taking of color photographs
of the areas of noticeable physical abuse. 20 They permit taking of x-rays
to determine the extent of internal injuries which might not be readily
noticeable from an external examination. The purpose for such a provi-
sion is to allow for complete documentation of abuse which can be
270. Id. at 1193.
271. Id. at 1193, 1194.
272. Hefer, The Responsibility and Role of the Physician, in THE BATTERED
CILD 28, 33 (Kempe & Heifer eds., 2d ed. 1974).
273. Id.
274. V. FONTANA, supra note 63, at 23.
275. MeCoid, supra note 81, at 28.
276. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-842.01(d) (West Supp. 1957-1977); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 42-810 (1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-106 (Cum. Supp. 1976); FLA. STAT. §
827.07(4)(c), as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.; ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 23, § 2056 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1977); IOWA CODE ANN. §235A.11 (West Cum.
Supp. 1977-1978); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3854.2(G) (West Cum. Supp. 1977-
1978); MIcH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.626(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 210.120 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.46 (West 1976);
N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 416 (McKinney 1976); OHIO REV. CODE § 2151.42.1 (Anderson
1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 418.764 (1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2207 (Purdon Cum.
Supp. 1977-1978); TEx. FAM. CODE tit. 2, § 35.04 (Cum. Supp. 1978); VA. CODE § 63.1-
248.13 (Cum. Supp. 1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.050 (Supp. 1976); W. VA.
CODE § 49-6A-4 (Cum. Supp. 1977); WYO. STAT. § 14-28.9(c) (Interim Supp. 1977).
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catalogued in a medical file. Such a medical file may then be entered
as evidence at a trial should the parents or guardian be prosecuted for
causing the injuries observed by the physician while examining the child.
One statute provides:
Any person required to investigate causes of suspected child abuse or
maltreatment may take or cause to be taken photographs of the areas of
trauma on a child who is subject to a report and, if the areas of trauma
visible on the child indicate a need for a radiological examination, may
cause the child to be referred for diagnosis to a licensed physician or an
emergency department in a hospital. Any licensed physician who has
reasonable cause to suspect that an injury was the result of child abuse
may authorize a radiological examination to be performed on the child.
The county in which the child is a resident shall bear the initial cost for
the x-rays of the abused child; however, the parent, guardian, or cus-
todian of the child shall be required to reimburse the county for the costs
of such x-rays, and to reimburse the Department of Rehabilitative Serv-
ices for the cost of photographs taken pursuant to this paragraph. Any
photographs or reports on x-rays taken pursuant to this section shall be
sent to the department at the time the written report is sent or as soon
thereafter as possible. 7
Permitting a physician to have photographs of x-rays taken of a
child he suspects of having been abused means that he need not first
obtain parental permission or release to do so. Other than ensuring that
a proper physical record is made documenting any evidence of child
abuse in the nature of physical trauma, commentators are divided as to
the extent to which physicians should be evidence gatherers or legal-
medico detectives. 78
The physician, as the person examining the child, is the individual
best able to determine whether the child's injuries are disparate from
the explanation given by the parents. 279 If the parent's explanation of the
child's injuries is different from what the physician's examination indi-
cates, the physician's report to the authorized receiving agency should
be given greater weight in the determination of whether physical abuse
277. FLA. STAT. § 827.07(4)(c), as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law
Serv.
278. See Krause, supra note 106, at 257; see also McCoid, supra note 81, at 28.
But see Paulsen, supra note 85, at 10.
279. McCoid, supra note 81, at 28.
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has been inflicted upon the child."' Those opposing the idea that a
physician may also function as a detective believe that it is beyond a
physician's competence "to determine who inflicted injuries on a
child."'2s1 A diagnosis of injury should be limited to no more than a
reasonable guess "that the injuries suffered were not caused by an un-
avoidable accident. ' 282
(k). The central registry. The idea of establishing central regis-
tries did not become popular until the mid-1960s. Since then, the trend
has been toward the establishment of registries either at the local level
or on a statewide basis. Only four states maintained registries in 1966
under legislative mandate.28 This increased to nineteen by 197 0 '28 with
forty states at present maintaining such registries through statutory
enactment.25
280. Krause, supra note 106, at 257. While identification of child abuse should
be tempered by awareness of the fact that children may suffer physical mars, bruises,
and scratches due neither to parental neglect nor intent, the treating physician must be
cognizant of discrepancies between the degree of the trauma and the history given to
explain the injuries. Essential tasks for the physician to consider are skillful interview-
ing, obtaining historical data, and performing physical examinations to rule out causes
of either abuse or neglect.
281. Paulsen, supra note 85, at 28.
282. Id.
283. Sussman, supra note 83, at 300.
284. V. DEFRANCIS, supra note 267, at 178.
285. The following states provide for the establishment of central registries
through statutory enactment: ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 22(3)(1) (Interim Supp. 1975);
ALASKA STAT. tit. 47, § 17.040 (Cum. Supp. 1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-818 (1977);
CAL. WELF. & INST. § 18960(g) (Deering Supp. 1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-114(1)
(Cum. Supp. 1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(g) (Cum. Supp. 1978); DEL.
CODE tit. 16, § 904(c) (Revised 1974); FLA. STAT. § 827.07(7), as amended by ch. 77-
429, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.; HAW. REV. STAT. § 350-2 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 16-
1623(c) (Cum. Supp. 1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2061 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp.
1977); IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A.14 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:403H (West 1974); Ma. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3859(2) (West Cum. Supp.
1977-1978); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A(i) (Replacement 1976); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 119, §§ 51E-51F (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §
722.627(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556(11) (West Cum.
Supp. 1978), as amended by ch. 212, 1977 Minn. Sess. Law Serv.; Miss. CODE ANN. §
43-24-1 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.145(2) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1506 (1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.504(l)(c) (1977); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 169:44 (Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.11 (West 1976); N.Y. Soc.
SERV. LAW § 422(1) (McKinney 1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-112 (1975); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 50-25.1-11 (Supp. 1977); OHIO REV. CODE § 2151.42.1 (Anderson 1976); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); OR. REV. STAT. § 418.765
1 60
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A large number of state laws establishing central registries make
reference to their use as diagnostic instruments or as research and plan-
ning tools."' As a practical matter, however, few states can show more
than sporadic use of their registries by professionals who have requested
information regarding suspicious cases of abuse or neglect."8 7 Registries
are often hampered by incomplete, inaccurate, and old information
which diminishes their effectiveness as part of a viable statewide child
protection program.
With the expansion in scope of the state child abuse laws, the
purposes and goals of the registries have changed somewhat. 8 The
impetus for their change has come with a reduction of evidentiary stan-
dards presently required by many of the reporting statutes-reasonable
suspicion of maltreatment, rather than the requirement of specific evi-
dence.2HI
One of the primary benefits of well-structured statewide central
registries is the ability of authorized officials to "trace" the abusive
adult so that his ability to avoid detection by continually bringing the
abused child to different doctors and hospitals is lessened.8 ' Some states
require that assistance be given to sister states when there is a reason-
able suspicion that abusive parents are "hospital shopping" across state
lines.28'
As a research tool, the central registries can be a boon to those
attempting to understand better the societal causes and interactions of
those who abuse and maltreat children. With properly motivated and
organized staff personnel, many of the registries presently in existence
could develop demographic and other studies which may increase under-
(1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2214(a) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 40-11-7 (1977); S.C. CODE § 20-310.4 (Cum. Supp. 1975); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 26-10-12.2 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1208 (Supp. 1977); TEX. FAM. CODE tit. 2,
§ 34.04 (Vernon 1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1356 (Cum. Supp. 1977); VA. CODE §
63.1-248.8 (Cum. Supp. 1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.070 (Supp. 1976); Wyo.
STAT. § 14.28.13 (Interim Supp. 1977).
286. NAT'L CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION & WELFARE, 3 CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: THE PROBLEM AND ITS
MANAGEMENT 14 (1975) [hereinafter referred to as 3 CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: THE
PROBLEM AND ITS MANAGEMENT].
287. Id.
288. Id. at 17.
289. Id.
290. Krause, supra note 106, at 246.
291. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-114(11) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
1 2:97
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standing of the nature and extent of abuse. 22 Such studies, when co-
ordinated with other child protective service plans, could evaluate the
effectiveness of a state's abuse prevention efforts.
The use, or, more accurately, the misuse of information placed in
central registries has been of much concern to those who fear infringe-
ment of the right to privacy of both child and parent. The court in Sims
v. State 3 held that although the state may investigate reports of abuse,
there exists no valid reason why the accused family should not have
access to the "fruits of that invasion or the conclusions reached." '94 The
court did recognize that where the confidentiality of the source had been
guaranteed either administratively or through a judicial hearing, such
information should not be released to the family.2 5
Although many of the reporting statutes make provision for the
confidentiality of stored information, there is surprisingly little uniform-
ity in guidelines which govern the dissemination of collected informa-
tion. 96 Some states do not legislatively mandate a specific procedure for
disclosure of information.297 Rather, these states leave the promulgation
of regulations to the agency designated to maintain the central regis-
try.298
292. 3 CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: THE PROBLEM AND ITS MANAGEMENT, supra
note 286, at 26.
293. 438 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
294. Id. at 1194, 1195, where the court held that the following provisions of TEx.
FAM. CODE tit. 2, §§ 34.05(c) and 34.08, are unconstitutional on their face.
295. Id.
296. Thirty-six states at present require that records gathered on suspected or
known cases of child abuse and neglect be kept confidential, and to varying degrees,
inaccessible to public scrutiny. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-114(4) (Cum. Supp.
1976); FLA. STAT. § 827.07(7), as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.;
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2061 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1977).
297. Typical of the statutes which fail to specify the procedure for ensuring the
confidentiality of information gathered by the central registries is ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
23, § 2061 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1977) which provides: "[Tlhe Department [of
Children and Family Services], by regulation, [shall] regulate the entry and retention
of child abuse and neglect information and access thereto."
298. The absence of legislative direction in the reporting statutes is dangerous to
the concept of individual privacy. Such statutes fail to define terms such as confidential-
ity, and to specify what agencies and professionals may have access to records. In
discussing these potential dangers, Sussman concludes that "in many states the ironic
situation is created whereby those for whom disclosure was originally intended make
little use of the register while other, unintended individuals, are granted relatively free
access." Sussman, Keeping Records on Suspected Child Abuse, in COUNCIL WOMAN
I1 (Winter 1977).
2:1978 1
50
Nova Law Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [1978], Art. 3
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol2/iss1/3
Child Abuse-Federal and State Response
There is growing concern among legal and social commentators
that irreparable harm may be caused to the child who may be labeled
an "abused child" for a lifetime.99 Of equal concern is the perpetuation
of inaccurate and unverified information which, if released, may dam-
age the person's reputation and threaten his livelihood. Since abuse and
neglect are now thought to be part of a repetitive cycle whereby one
generation passes to another the characteristics of the abusive parent,
government agencies may become inclined to make undue observation
of a child so labeled as he attains adulthood, marries, and has children
of his own.3°°
To alleviate the concerns of those who believe unbridled use of
central registries may cause more harm than good, an increasing num-
ber of states have very strict guidelines for the classification and expung-
ing of reports."' One agency is usually authorized to receive, investi-
gate, and follow up on suspected cases of abuse or neglect. A single
agency controlling all aspects of the investigation process will minimize
the danger of misuse of the registry.
When a suspected case of child abuse reaches the receiving agency,
the case goes through a number of distinct classifications. These classifi-
cations in the Florida child abuse statute are termed: under investiga-
tion; abuse indicated; and abuse unfounded."' Upon completing an
investigatory report, the receiving agency makes a determination
whether the report is unfounded or indicates abuse."3 Reporting laws
in a number of states provide that information be removed immediately
from the registry if it is unfounded or otherwise inappropriately gath-
ered or stored.0 4 Some states also provide that information gathered
and stored in the registry will be expunged once the child attains a
299. It has been suggested that information received by the central registries may
at some future date be used to raise "the issue of competency of a family or the risk to
a child." 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 710 (statement of Eli Newberger).
300. Id.
301. See, e.g., ARK. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-818(4) to 818(6) (1977); FLA. STAT. §
827.07(7), as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.
302. FLA. STAT. § 827.07(8), as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.,
has established this classification system for categorizing "all reports of child abuse or
maltreatment maintained within the central registry ..
303. See note 186, supra.
304. FLA. STAt. § 827.07(8), as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.,
states that "[a]ll identifying information contained in reports classified as unfounded
shall be immediately expunged."
12:1978 63 1
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certain age, usually eighteen. 05 In other instances, a statutorily deter-
mined length of time is established which begins when the case of child
abuse is first reported. Seven years is the length of time used in Flor-
ida.30
Access to information stored in central registries is usually re-
stricted to receiving agency personnel. Limited access may be permitted
to information on file for valid research in some states.0 Restrictions
placed on such access includes the anonymity of the abused child, abus-
ing parent, or guardian and reporter.
To maintain the confidentiality of the information stored in the
central registries, twenty-six states include a penalty provision for per-
sons divulging information in an unauthorized manner.38 Fines range
from $10031 to $1,000, with a jail sentence of up to two years.310
(1). Failure to provide medical care because of religious
beliefs. Numerous United States Supreme Court decisions have held
that the parent-child relationship is a fundamental part of our so-
ciety.3 1' The care, custody, and nurture of children has been the primary
305. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2214(n) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978).
306. FLA. STAT. § 827.07(8), as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.,
places a limit on how long information may remain within the registry, which at this
time is seven years. This section provides, however, that if the individual remains under
the supervision of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, then the
information shall remain within the registry until the Department determines otherwise.
307. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-115(2) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
308. ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 22(3)(3) (Interim Supp. 1975); ALASKA STAT. §
47.17.040(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-818 (1977); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 19-10-114(10) (Cum. Supp. 1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(g) (Cum. Supp.
1978); IOWA CODE ANN. § 12-3-4.20 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); KAN. STAT. § 38-
723 (Cum. Supp. 1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403 I (West 1974); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 3859(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, §
51E-5IF (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); MIcH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 722.633(2) (West
Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-24-5 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 210.150(2) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1506 (1975); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 200.5045(2) (1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169:45 (Supp. 1975); N.Y.
Soc. SERV. LAW § 422(10) (McKinney 1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-14 (Supp.
1977); OHIo REV. CODE § 2151.42.1 (Anderson 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846
(West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2215(g) (Purdon Cum. Supp.
1977-1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-13 (1977); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-10-12.3
(1976); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1356 (Cum. Supp. 1977); W. VA. CODE § 49-614-8
(Cum. Supp. 1977); Wyo. STAT. § 14-28.14(a) (Interim Supp. 1977).
309. W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-8 (Supp. 1977).
310. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51F (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978).
311. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972), where the Supreme
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function of the family. The child's reciprocal right to this parental sup-
port, however, is also a concern of the courts.1 2 Recognition of this
conflict has led a number of states to include a statutory exclusion from
their definitions of abuse or neglect pertaining to "spiritual treatment."
Proper use of this exclusion is of paramount concern when children have
been threatened by parental unwillingness to accede to emergency medi-
cal care which involves surgery or blood transfusions.
Even though many persons place little faith in spiritual healing,
those who do may hold a strong belief which should be interfered with
only under extraordinary circumstances. There exists a constitutional
obligation to permit a liberal exercise of the freedom of religion among
individuals. A dilemma arises where this exercise of religious freedom
endangers the welfare of a minor.31 3 The courts must balance the rights
of the parent to religious freedom with the equally fundamental right
of the child to live.314
The number of states permitting this "spiritual treatment" exemp-
tion has steadily increased. In 1967, seven states had such an exemption
in their reporting statutes, while seventeen states did so by 1974 .315
Twenty-seven states at present include the exemption in their reporting
statutes.3 16 Many of these states seek a compromise which recognizes
Court stated that it had "frequently emphasized the importance of the family." The
Court further noted "that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the
parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the
state can neither supply nor hinder."
312. Singleman, supra note 9, at 1062. See, e.g., Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535
(1973).
313. See In re Ivey, 319 So. 2d 53 (Fla. Ist DCA 1975), holding that in a life or
death situation, as confirmed by the treating physician, treatment may be ordered under
the state juvenile judicial treatment statute to treat the dependent child without first
seeking the consent or approval of the parents. The court interpreted FLA. STAT. §
827.07(2) (1975) as not precluding the court from ordering either that medical services
be provided or that treatment by a duly accredited practitioner who relies solely on
spiritual means of healing be provided to the children. Recognizing the ambiguity of
the statute section, the Florida Legislature recently enacted an amendment to the child
abuse statute which greatly clarifies the authority of a court to order medical care when
the health of children requires it. For the text of pertinent portions of FLA. STAT. §
827.07(2), as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law Serv., see note 317, infra.
314. V. DEFRANCIS, supra note 267, at 180.
315. Sussman, supra note 83, at 306.
316. ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 21 (Interim Supp. 1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-807
(1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38d (1975); DEL. CODE tit. 16, § 906 (Revised
1974); D.C. CODE § 2-166 (1973); FLA. STAT. § 827.07(2), as amended by ch. 77-429,
1977 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.; HAw. REV. STAT. § 350-4 (1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, §
12:1978
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a parent's right to seek in "good faith" care for an ill child by means
of Christian Science or by the teachings of a "well-recognized reli-
gion."3,7
Regulations issued by the Social and Rehabilitation Service of the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare on January 19, 1977,
implementing the Federal Act addressed the issue of "spiritual treat-
ment. 318 In defining the phrase "harm or threatened harm to a child's
health or welfare," 319 the regulations provide a qualified exemption for
"spiritual treatment." This regulation states "that when a parent or
guardian legitimately practicing his religious beliefs fails to provide
specified medical treatment for a child, such failure alone shall not be
considered neglect. ' 30 The House Bill proposing the extension of the
Federal Act recognizes the validity of this administrative decision by
expanding the Federal Act's definition of abuse and neglect. The House
Bill provides that a child who does not receive medical treatment by a
parent or guardian "solely as a result of the legitimate practicing of
religious beliefs of the parent or guardian ' 31 will not be considered an
2054 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1977); KAN. STAT. § 38-722 (Cum. Supp. 1977); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403 B (4) (West 1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3852(l)
(West Supp. 1975); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.634 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556(2)(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); Miss. CODE ANN. §
43-21-5(h) (Cum. Supp. 1977); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.115(3) (Vernon Cum. Supp.
1978); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.5011(2) (1977); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.42.1
(Anderson 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); OR.
REV. STAT. § 418.740(1)(b) (1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2203 (Purdon Cum. Supp.
1977-1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-15 (1977); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §26-10-1.1 (1976);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-16-1.5 (Supp. 1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1352 (Cum. Supp.
1977); VA. CODE § 63.1-248.2(A)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
26.44.020 (Supp. 1976); WYO. STAT. § 14-28.7(a)(vii) (Interim Supp. 1977).
317. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 827.07(2), as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess.
Law Serv. The Florida statute provides in part:
A parent or guardian legitimately practicing his religious beliefs who thereby does
not provide specified medical treatment for a child shall not, for that reason alone,
be construed a negligent parent or guardian; however, such an exception shall not
preclude a court from ordering, when the health of the child requires it, that:
(a) Medical services from a licensed physician as defined herein, or
(b) Treatment by a duly accredited practitioner who relies solely on spirit-
ual means for healing in accordance with the tenets and practices of a well
recognized church or religious organization, be provided.
318. [1977 Reference File] FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 101:0061.
319. Id. at 101:0062.
320. Id.
321. 1977 HOUSE AMENDMENTS, supra note 90, at 10.
2:1978 1
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abused or neglected child. The House Bill also states that this exception
will not preclude a court from ordering that medical services be pro-
vided to a child, where the child's health and well-being require it.322
(m). The guardian ad litem. The guardian ad litem is a special
guardian appointed by the court for the specific purpose of protecting
the child's interest.3z His position is unique in that his obligations to
the child are transient in nature and limited in scope. He usually has
no contact with the child prior to his appointment, nor does his repre-
sentation of the child continue after the conclusion of the case. A guard-
ian ad litem need not be an attorney, except where it is specifically
required by statute.MA Increasingly it is being recognized that as juve-
nile courts become more complex in their proceedings and cognizant of
protecting all parties' rights of due process, the special skills of an
attorney are best suited to ensure the satisfaction of the child's best
interests.32
It has been shown that a child's interests will be endangered in cases
of willful child abuse.326 The juvenile court is responsible for the well-
being of a child in an abuse proceeding, and one commentator suggests
that an independent representative be appointed by the court.3s Two
reasons have been given for the need of such independent representation.
First, as the child in many cases is abused by his own parents, it would
be unwise to believe that his best interests would be protected by having
an attorney represent him as well as his parents.32 1 Second, in states
where the petitioner is the local social service agency, there is a real
question as to whether its resources of time and personnel are available
to represent the child adequately in an abuse case.32 The guardian ad
litem, being a third party to a court action, is technically an advocate
for the interests of the child rather than an adversary pitted against the
322. Id.
323. BLACK'S LAW DiCTIONARY 834 (4th ed. rev. 1968) defines a guardian ad
litem as "a guardian appointed by a court of justice to prosecute or defend for an infant
in any suit to which he may be a party."
324. E.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a()(2) (Cum. Supp. 1978). The Con-
necticut statute requires that counsel be appointed by the court to represent the best
interests of the child.
325. See Krause, supra note 106, at 263; Fraser, supra note 83, at 21; Sussman,
supra note 83, at 304.
326. See text accompanying notes 67-78, supra.
327. Fraser, supra note 83, at 17.
328. Fraser, supra note 153, at 118.
329. Grumet, supra note 62, at 314.
67 1I 2:1978
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parents, social services, or the prosecutor's office.
At the present time, twenty-two states provide for the mandatory
appointment of a guardian ad litem to represent the interests of the child
in an abuse proceeding.330 Six other states allow the appointment of a
guardian ad litem for children in cases of abuse resulting in the com-
mencement of judicial proceedings.3 ' The reporting statutes vary as
to the degree of legislative instruction given to those appointed as guar-
dians ad litem. One state simply provides that a guardian ad litem be
appointed in a judicial proceeding involving a child in a child abuse
case.311 Other states, however, specify more exactly the parameters of
a guardian ad litem's authority and responsibilities. These responsibili-
ties include (1) an investigatory role wherein the guardian ad litem may
have access to all pertinent records, may interview witnesses, and may
examine and cross-examine witnesses at hearings; 3 (2) an advocacy
role whereby the guardian ad litem ensures that all necessary facts are
brought to the attention of the court;334 (3) a counselor role wherein
330. ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 24(1) (Interim Supp. 1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-817
(1977); CAL. WELF. & INST. § 326 (Deering Supp. 1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-
113(3) (Cum. Supp. 1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(f)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1978);
IDAHO CODE § 16-1618 (Cum. Supp. 1977); KAN. STAT. § 38-815(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3858 (West Supp. 1975); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §
722.630 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-11 (Cum. Supp.
1977); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.160 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978); N.C. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-
8.23 (West 1976); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 249 (1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-08
(Supp. 1977); OHIO REV. CODE § 2151.28.1 (Anderson 1976); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §
2223(a) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-14 (1977); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 26-10-12.1 (Cum. Supp. 1975); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-248 (1977);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-16-7 (Supp. 1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.44.010-.053
(Supp. 1976); Wyo. STAT. § 14-28.12:1(a) (Interim Supp. 1977).
Virginia, in a recent legislative session, repealed the guardian ad litem provision
of its child abuse statute. VA. CODE § 63.1-248.12 (repealed 1977).
331. FLA. STAT. § 827.07(12), as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law
Serv.; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403 G (7) (West 1974); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §
10-1310(12) (Supp. 1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-25(G) (Replacement 1976); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846(B) (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); W. VA. CODE § 49-6-1(a)
(Cum. Supp. 1977).
332. UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-16-7 (Supp. 1977).
333. E.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 3858 (Supp. 1975). The Maine statute pro-
vides: "[H]e shall make such further investigation as he deems necessary to ascertain
the facts," which may include "reviewing psychiatric, psychological and physical exami-
nations of the child, parents or other persons having custody, interviewing witnesses,
examining and cross-examining witnesses. .. ."
334. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-817 (1977). The Arkansas statute requires that
the guardian ad litem shall participate in the proceeding, whether that proceeding is
56
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the guardian ad litem recommends various options to the court;3 and
(4) a guardian role whereby the guardian ad litem represents the child
and seeks to ensure the protection of his interests.33 1
The guardian ad litem provisions also hold him to be knowledge-
able about the condition of the child and the facts of the case.3 7 A
guardian ad litem may order the examination by a physician, psychia-
trist, or psychologist of any parent or child or other person having
custody of the child at the time of the alleged abuse3s By statute,
every opportunity should be afforded to the guardian ad litem so that
he can perform properly a complex task whose outcome may have a
crucial effect upon a generation of abused children.
(2). LEGISLATIVE TRENDS IN THE STATE REPORTING LAWS
After having examined the current reporting laws, certain future
trends in the area are discernible. The state legislatures, partly due to
the impetus of grants provided by the Federal Act,339 are shaping their
reporting laws toward a more clearly defined "interventionist" role with
respect to the family unit. This intervention by the state into the lives
and welfare of individuals is the result of a general pattern of increased
dispositional or adjudicatory in nature. He shall also participate in the proceeding "to
the degree appropriate for adequately representing the child."
335. E.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §722.630(10) (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978).
The Michigan statute requires that the guardian ad litem make recommendations to the
court which are in the best interests of the child.
336. E.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 19-10-113 (Cum. Supp. 1976). The Colorado
statute provides that "the guardian ad litem shall be charged in general with the repre-
sentation of the child's interests."
337. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(f) (Cum. Supp. 1978). The Connecti-
cut statute provides that "the child shall be represented by counsel appointed by the
court to speak in behalf of the best interests of the child, which counsel shall be knowl-
edgeable about the needs and protection of children ... "
338. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.053 (Supp. 1977). The Washington
statute calls upon the court, by its own motion, "or the motion of the guardian ad litem,
or other parties, [to] order the examination by a physician, psychologist or psychiatrist,
of any parent or child or other person having custody of the child at the time of the
alleged child abuse or neglect," upon clear evidence that an instance of child abuse or
neglect has occurred.
But see Sims v. State, 438 F. Supp. 1179, 1191 (S.D. Tex. 1977), where the court
declared that due process must extend to the "investigative stage of state action."
Should psychiatric or physical examinations be objected to by the parents, an
"adversary hearing before a judicial body" must be held.
339. See text accompanying notes 102-13, supra.
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governmental action programs which, until recently, have been almost
exclusively affairs of the community or of the individual.
With respect to the future course of the state reporting laws, this
writer believes that there are three areas which will come under in-
creased legislative scrutiny at the state level. These areas are: (1) the use
of protective services as a means of preventing the recurrence of child
abuse within the family; (2) the continuing expansion of the definition
of child abuse and neglect which will encompass the concept of "mental
injury;" and (3) the establishment of evidentiary standards which will
make it easier for the state to show abusive or neglectful conduct by a
parent or guardian in a legal action. Other trends include the further
expansion of the reporters mandated to report known or suspected in-
stances of child abuse known personally to them; universal immunity
from civil or criminal prosecution for reporting a case of child abuse or
neglect in good faith, or participating in a judicial hearing based upon
a report given pursuant to the provisions of the law; and the increased
use of the state central registries as repositories of data on verified cases
of child abuse. It is anticipated that stringent restrictions will be placed
on access to the files in the registries. To accomplish this, specific mea-
sures must be developed at the legislative level to purge from the files
unfounded, unmeaningful, and inapplicable information which meet the
parameters of an individual's right to privacy.
(a). Protective services. Legislators in many states have come to
the realization that there exists a profound limitation on what legislative
action can accomplish in solving deep-seated social problems. Most
child abuse laws are reporting laws and do not cover other aspects of
the problem, such as therapeutic assistance for the child and his family.
Without the proper institutional framework, the law and the legislative
process cannot create better services or better trained child protection
staffs. Some states have already created the institutional framework for
the reporting and investigation of suspected cases of child abuse and
neglect.4 0 Most of these laws establish a mechanism for the provision
of some type of treatment services.
340. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-109(6)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1976) ("It is the
intent of the general assembly to encourage the creation 9 f one or more child protection
teams in each county or contiguous group of counties."); N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 423
(McKinney 1976) ("Every local department of social services shall establish a 'child
protective service' within such department."); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2216(a) (Purdon
Cum. Supp. 1977-1978) ("Every county public child welfare agency shall establish a
'child protective service' within each agency.")
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It must be recognized, however, that treatment services are the
least developed part of the child protective system. Counseling, protec-
tive supervision, foster care, and temporary shelter care have been the
predominant treatment services available in most communities for the
past twenty years.
There exist two diverging points of view as to what should be the
ultimate goals of the child protective services at the community level.
One view is that the role of child protective services should be expanded
to include provisions for long-range ameliorative treatment services.
The other view calls for the establishment of services designed to deal
with the short-term effect of abuse and neglect. These diverging views
are related to the primary and secondary prevention of abuse. Primary
prevention refers to the prevention of abuse before it occurs; secondary
intervention fills the short-term needs of preventing abuse, as it is after-
the-fact intervention. Expansion of legislation along these lines will
probably be limited by the extent to which the states are able to provide
necessary funding in the face of the current fiscal difficulties.
(b). Expansion of the definition of child abuse and neglect. The
definition of abuse used in many of the early reporting statutes has
gradually been expanded to include neglect, sexual abuse, lind emotional
deprivation. The dilemma faced by mandated reporters, social service
personnel, and the courts alike is how best to determine whether an
instance of abuse has occurred in any given suspected case. The reason
for this uncertainty rests primarily with the definition of abuse set out
in the reporting laws. In many states, abuse has become synonymous
with any harm to a child that resulted from a parent's or guardian's acts
of commission or omission which cause injury." '
A number of states have expanded their definitions of abuse to
include the concept of mental injury. This particular type of injury has
been described as a state of substantially reduced psychological or intel-
lectual functioning in relation to a number of factors which may vary
from state to state.32 Some of these include failure to thrive, 43 the
341. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2203 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978).
342. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 827.07(l)(i), as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess.
Law Serv.
343. "Failure to thrive" refers to the condition of a child (usually under the age
of one year) "who fails to grow in height and weight and to develop in personal-social,
adaptive, language, or fine and gross motor areas, as compared to pre-established
standards over a period of time (generally several weeks)." NAT'L CENTER ON CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT, U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, 2 CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT: THE PROBLEM AND ITS MANAGEMENT 39-40 (1975).
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ability to think and reason, and the control of aggressive or self-
destructive impulses. These injuries must, however, be clearly attributa-
ble to the inability or unwillingness on the part of the parent or guardian
to exercise a minimum degree of care toward the child.344
(c). Evidentiary standards in a child abuse case. One commen-
tator has noted that it is extremely difficult to prove a case of child
abuse committed by a parent, owing to the high standard of proof which
must be met by the prosecution in a judicial proceeding. 3 5 There is an
argument that while criminal prosecution of the battering parent 3"1 may
satiate society's desire for retribution, it does not cure the problem of
individual cases of child abuse; nor does it take into consideration the
child's independent interests. 37 Further, it has been argued that there
exists a risk that criminal prosecution of the parents may result in
irreparable harm to the best interests of the child.38
In most family courts, even though the standard of proof to be met
is that of a preponderance of the evidence rather than proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, "this standard must be met by legally sufficient evi-
dence. ' '349 The prosecution in many instances is bound to rely on cir-
cumstantial evidence. To alleviate the prosecutor's burden somewhat, a
number of states have enacted legislation designed to allow "evidence
that the child has been abused or has sustained a nonaccidental injury
[to] . . . constitute prima facie evidence . . sufficient to support an
adjudication that such [a] child is uncared for or neglected. ' 350
344. E.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-10-103(l)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
345. Fraser, supra note 153, at 117.
346. The Court of Appeals for Maryland in a 1975 decision held in State v.
Fabritz, 276 Md. 416, 348 A.2d 275 (1975) that the state's child abuse statute applied
to a mother's failure to obtain medical help for her badly injured daughter. "The
mother, embarrassed by the condition of her daughter's body" after she had left the
child in the custody of another man and woman, refused to take her child to the hospital
even after noting that her daughter was in a semicomatose state. Recent statutory
changes have made the parent liable for the "unattended worsening of obviously serious
medical conditions." The court viewed such conduct as being the equivalent of inflicting
physical injury. The court further stated that this was "especially true since the statute
makes the parent responsible for providing the necessities of life including medical
care." Therefore, the Court of Appeals found that criminal child abuse was properly
found by the trial court.
347. See Friedrich & Borniskin, supra note 40, at 216; Fraser, supra note 153, at
119; Grumet, supra note 62, at 307.
348. Fraser, supra note 153, at 119.
349. Paulsen, supra note 190, at 155.
350. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(f)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
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A number of jurisdictons have recognized the battered child syn-
drome in criminal cases when the syndrome is enunciated by an expert
witness.3 51 Such an expert witness is usually the treating physician but
may as well be a pathologist or other medically-trained person. The
Supreme Court of California in Landeros v. Flood-2 recognized that
there exists widespread knowledge of what constitutes the battered child
syndrome within the medical community. It is likely that other states
will judicially recognize the battered child syndrome as being capable
of diagnosis in the ordinary course of a physician's practice, and the
testimony based upon the symptoms of the syndrome will be admissible
into evidence in court.
3. CONCLUSION
Social problems and some of their more disturbing trends across
the country are amenable neither to easy solutions nor to legislative
actions at the state or federal level. Realistically, it must be recognized
that the term "child abuse" is as much a political concept, defined to
draw attention to the existing social problem, as it is a scientific concept
which can be used to measure a specific phenomenon. The use of child
abuse as a tool to make the public conscious of the problem has allowed
state reporting laws to define the term as broadly or loosely as desired
in order to magnify concern on this issue.
Mere reporting laws are not enough satisfactorily to combat abuse
and neglect in this country. Positive programs at the state and local level
must implement protective services for the child and therapeutic services
to both child and parent. Without such programs it is clear that no "law
can be better than its implementation, and its implementation can be
no better than its resources permit." 3
Effective measures to find a feasible solution to the problem must
be based on long-term prevention. Recognizing child abuse as an infec-
tious disease in which the victim becomes the carrier, with each genera-
tion passing on the illness to its children, underlines the need to detect,
intervene in, and prevent the disease. The reporting laws, when they
351. See, e.g., People v. Jackson, 18 Cal. App. 3d 504, 95 Cal. Rptr. 919 (4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1971) and State v. Loss, 295 Minn. 271, 204 N.W.2d 404 (1973), where
expert testimony given by physicians concerning the battered child syndrome was admit-
ted into evidence.
352. See text accompanying notes 207-20, supra.
353. Paulsen, supra note 85, at 49.
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include provisions for protective services, can be utilized only if the full
resources of the state can be brought to bear to meet the needs of the
abused child and family on a case-by-case basis. Such a concerted effort
can be accomplished only in light of certain fundamental rights of the
abusive parents, the parents patriae interests of the state in protecting
the health and well-being of children, and, lastly, the unspoken interest
of the child. Protection of the child's interest must include adequate and
timely representation by a guardian ad litem at any hearing which may
result in removing the child from the family.
William C. Redden
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